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QUIETISM

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It has been too much the custom to treat Quietism as a sporadic type of religion, as a sort of capricious "sport," to use a familiar botanical term, expressing itself in two or three famous, but solitary and isolated, mystics on the continent of Europe, and to assume that later evidences of Quietism must be traced back to the teachings of these few rare expounders of it. I am convinced, on the contrary, that these select individuals were only luminous examples of a profound religious tendency, which, in varying form of expression, swept over the entire western world in the latter part of the seventeenth and the early part of the eighteenth centuries, flooded into the consciousness of all who were intensely religious, and left an "unimaginable touch" even on the rank and file of believers. It was a deep and widespread movement, confined to no one country and it was limited to no one branch of the Christian Church. It burst forth in sundry places and spread like a new Pentecost, through kindled personalities and through quick and powerful books of genius.

Quietism was the most acute and intense stage of European mysticism. It was not a wholly new type of inward religion. It was rather a result of the normal ripening, the irresistible maturing, of experiences, ideas,

and principles that had been profoundly working for a very long period in the religious consciousness of Europe—a fact which partly explains its seemingly spontaneous appearance in a number of widely separated localities. It was an intense and glowing faith in the direct invasion of God into the sphere of human personality—a faith rising in many cases to the level of indubitable experience—but a faith, at the same time, indissolubly bound up with a fundamental conception of man's total depravity and spiritual bankruptcy. It must be understood at the outset that Quietism does not spell lethargy and inaction; it does not mean folded hands and a little more sleep; it is not a religion for lotus-eaters. The Quietist may and often did, swing out into a course of action that would make the rationally centred Christian quail with fear and slink to cover. It is not a question of action or of non-action; it is a question of *the right way to initiate action*. The Quietist holds a peculiar view in reference to the kind of spring, incentive, or "motor-cue" that can inaugurate a spiritual act. For him all acts that are motivated by human consciousness, all aims designed, arranged, and planned by reason and the will of man, bear the mark and brand of the "creature" and are below the sphere of the spiritual. All thoughts and strivings that originate in mere man are spiritually barren and unfruitful. There are two levels or storeys to the universe. One level is the realm of "nature," which has passed through a moral catastrophe that broke its inherent connection with the divine and so left it godless and ruined. The other level is the "supernatural" realm where God is throned in power and splendor as spiritual Ruler. Nothing spiritual can originate on the level of "nature"; it can come only from "yonder." The main problems of religion, on this theory, are problems concerning the way in which the chasm is spanned between these two divided, sundered realms.

Quietism has its own peculiar answer to this urgent question. It had its birth and its nurture in the absolute despair of human nature which Protestant theology and the Counter-Reformation had greatly intensified. It flourished on an extreme form of the doctrine of the ruin and fall of man—an utter miserabilism of the “creature.” The trail of the old Adam lies over all that man does or thinks. The taint of the “creature” spoils all that springs from this source and fountain. Nothing divine, nothing that has religious value, can originate in man as man. The true and essential preparation therefore for spiritual ministry or for any action in the truth and life, seemed to the Quietist to be the repose of all one’s own powers, the absence of all efforts of self-direction, of all strain and striving, the annihilation of all confidence in one’s own capacities, the complete quiet of the “creature.” Then out of this silence of all flesh, out of this calm of contemplation, in which the mind thinks and desires and wills nothing—this pure repose—divine movings will spontaneously come, the extraordinary grace of openings will be made, an inner burst of revelation will be granted, the sure direction of divine pointings will be given, a spiritual fecundity will be graciously vouchsafed. Passivity and emptiness are thus only conditions of divine moving; they are only stages on the way to action. And the Quietist may become, without any violation of his principle, a hundred-horse-power man of deeds.

What I have been calling the state of “passivity” and “emptiness” needs further comment and elucidation. “Passivity,” of the effective sort, might better be called concentration or absorption. It is a state of inner life in which all the powers and functions of consciousness are brought into complete focal unity, so that all dualisms of self and other vanish, all tendencies to scatter disappear, all vagrant suggestions and inhibitions are absent.

The soul is unified, intensified, fused, penetrated, and *stands absolutely on attention*. The Quietist believed that this state was reached by a single act, a mighty act, and when once this state was reached, the soul became a living centre of receptivity. We speak here of quietude, repose, passivity; but it would appear that at no other time and under no other conditions is there such intense spiritual *action*. There is such complete concentration, such unmixed absorption, such undivided inner unity, that the mind takes no note of its own processes and does not reflect upon its intent or content. Von Hügel very aptly says that the absence of the direct consciousness of the self and of what is happening within is a characteristic of the deepest and most creative moments, and this is true whether the action is confined to the inward or outward sphere. "The degree of mind or will-force," he says, "operating in Nelson at Trafalgar and in Napoleon at Waterloo, or again in St. Ignatius of Antioch in the Amphitheatre, and in Savonarola at the stake, was evidently in the precisely contrary ratio to their direct consciousness of it or of themselves at all."¹

The primary aspirations and the profoundest travail of soul of those who set forth on this spiritual pilgrimage are for the crucifixion of self and the death of the "creature," and the goal of the pilgrimage is the attainment of a state of *pure* repose and contemplation in which God flows in and takes the place of the crucified me, becomes the only inward reality, and inaugurates whatever action is acceptable to His perfect and holy will. The highest spiritual state, on whatever path the soul is travelling, is to the Quietist always "pure," i.e. it is a state uncontaminated by any definite mental content. "Pure love," which is love in its consummation, is a love that loves nothing finite or particular. All selfishness is purged away and it seeks no return. It loves for

¹ The Mystical Element of Religion, Vol. II, p. 133.

the sake of love alone. "Pure faith," which is faith at the *n*th degree, is a concentrated, unalloyed, and intense assent or swing of soul to God without the content and filling of any definite ideas or beliefs or expectations. "Pure prayer," which is prayer at its real efficacious level, is an absorbed and unitive state, in which not only all selfish thoughts and desires are obliterated but all thoughts and desires of every description are banished. The soul and God have met, and all of self is hushed as His presence flows in and bathes the soul with the fountains of Life.

This extreme form of religious mysticism, which culminated in the teachings of Molinos, Guyon, and Fénelon, was already current, even in England, before Madame Guyon was born, and it was a waxing influence for more than half a century. It is clearly described in Jeremy Taylor's *Life of Christ*, which was first published in 1649. "Beyond this [type of meditation] I have described," he writes, "there is a degree of meditation so exalted that it changes the very name, and is called contemplation. It is in the unitive way of religion, that is, it consists in unions and adherences to God; it is a prayer of quietness and silence, a meditation extraordinary, a *discourse without variety*, a vision and intuition of divine excellences, an immediate entry into an orb of light, and a resolution of all our faculties into sweetness, affections, and starings upon the divine beauty."² His further description of the way to this state of pure contemplation is a very happy attempt to express that which passes expression—that which, as he says, is "not to be discoursed of but felt." "When persons have been long softened with the continual droppings of religion, and their spirits made timorous [i.e. sensitive] and apt for impression by the assiduity of prayer and perpetual alarms of death and the continual dyings of mortification;

² Taylor's *Life of Christ* (Edition of 1850, London), Vol. II, p. 139.

the fancy [i.e. creative imagination], which is a very great instrument of devotion, is kept continually warm, and in a disposition and aptitude to take fire *and to flame out into great ascents.*"³

Another famous Englishman of the sixteenth century, who taught and practised interior or wordless prayer, was John Hales—often called "the ever-memorable Mr. John Hales of Eton" (b. 1584). In his *Golden Remains* he says of prayer:

"Nay, one thing I know more, that the prayer which is the most forcible transcends and far exceeds all power of words. For St. Paul, speaking unto us of the most effectual kind of prayer, calls it sighs and groans that cannot be expressed. Nothing cries so loud in the ears of God as the sighing of a contrite and earnest heart. . . . It requires not the voice but the mind; not the stretching of the hands but the intention of the heart; not any outward shape or carriage of the body but the inward behavior of the understanding. How then can it slacken your worldly business and occasions to mix them with sighs and groans, which are the most effectual prayer?"

This is not yet fully developed Quietism, and the characteristic terminology and the sacred phrases of the later exponents are not yet coined. But the quietistic tendency is here obvious, and the set of the current is strongly indicated. The great continental movement itself—the apotheosis of Quietism—which we must now study in some detail, was only the fearless and unrestrained expansion and fulfilment of what was implicit in the mysticism of the preceding century, especially in the mysticism of the Counter-Reformation in Roman Catholic countries. As a matter of fact, Quietism was implicit not only in the mysticism of the Counter-Reformation but in all Christian mysticism which shows a strong Neoplatonic strain. It is quite easy to find it in St. Augustine; indeed, his doctrine of grace and his view of man furnish the very ground and basis for fully developed

³ Taylor's *Life of Christ* (Edition of 1850, London), Vol. II, p. 140.

Quietism. Thomas à Kempis, in his *Imitation of Christ*, is a master expert both in the language of Quietism and in the thing itself. The influence of this book in England was beyond question one of the direct sources of English Quietism in the seventeenth century. The other St. Thomas—Thomas Aquinas—who laid, deep and solid, the foundations for so many phases of spiritual thought, has much to say both of the unitive, concentrated consciousness of inner quiet and also of that perfect love which “clings to God for His own sake,” with “no thought of any good thing that may accrue from it.”

The great names in the directly influential mystical movement of the Counter-Reformation are St. Ignatius Loyola (1491–1556), who is known in history as the founder of the Society of Jesus, or Jesuits, rather than as the great mystic which he was; St. Teresa (1515–1582), the greatest of the group; St. John of the Cross (1542–1591); St. Francis de Sales (1567–1622); St. Jeanne Françoise de Chantal (1572–1642); and St. Vincent de Paul (1576–1660).

“Stout Cortes,” fighting his way over barren stretches of ocean, through strange jungles inhabited by fierce beasts and fiercer men, to a new and seemingly limitless ocean on which he gazed, “silent, upon a peak in Darien,” was not stouter of heart or bolder of spirit than were these contemporaries of his who explored the uncharted and unfathomable seas within themselves and tracked their way through still stranger jungles in the human heart to the shoreless Sea whose tides seemed to surge into their channels.

This movement constitutes, without question, one of the most important chapters in religious history. Here one may see the human spirit on its most steep and difficult pilgrimage, its most dizzy and daring ascents, braving darkness and loneliness and silence and cross on its secret way to God. Like Abraham, these children

of faith went out, not knowing whither they went, risking absolutely everything in time and eternity on their quest, which was total absorption in God, the annihilation of self, the substitution of divine action for action directed by human will, and the attainment of a perfect and selfless love.

No other experts in the mystical way of any epoch have given us more keen and exhaustive analyses of the steps, the stages, the processes, of the deadly war with self, of the total eclipse of all that is "me" or "mine," of the dark night of the soul, than these great spiritual geniuses of the sixteenth century have given in their books; nor have heroic souls ever been less daunted by suffering and crucifixion than were these tremendous lovers of the suffering Christ.

They were more sane and robust and well-balanced than their successors, the Quietists in the seventeenth century; but the latter movement was undoubtedly the offspring of the earlier one, and though marked by a changed emphasis and a new emotional tone, Quietism drew its terminology, its stock of ideas, its methods, its practices, and the model of its characteristic experiences from the great mystics of the Counter-Reformation, especially from Teresa, John of the Cross, and Francis de Sales. Before the word "Quietism" came into use and before ecclesiastics on the watch-tower perceived the rising storm, these earlier mystical writers had been "building all inward," and had been exalting the "empty," "motionless" inner state, the will that "wills nothing," the "one single act," which brings "irresistible grace" into operation within the soul.

Sporadic groups of persons, claiming divine illumination and making use of silence and passive orison to promote the union of the soul with God, appeared through the first half of the seventeenth century both in Spain and Italy and, as we have seen, in England. The

Spanish mystic, Juan Falconi (1596-1638), a member of the Order of "Our Lady of Mercy," a passionately devout soul, saturated with the teachings of the mystics, was one of the early exponents of Quietism who deeply influenced the movement in Spain, Italy, and France. An important letter on silent interior prayer was written by him in 1628. It was printed in Spain in 1657, and was shortly after translated into Italian and very widely circulated in Italy, and a little later was put into French and read throughout France.⁴ Falconi thinks but little of "*sensible* divine operations," i.e. operations which give a definite content to the mind. He urges his reader to rise above these lower stages and settle herself into the presence of God by an interior act of faith which abandons everything of self, for time and for eternity. "Dwell in silence. Think of nothing, however good, however sublime it may be. Dwell only in pure faith in God and in utter resignation to his holy will."⁵ In the prayer of interior silence in which the soul is absolutely abandoned to the will of God and in which it knows not what it does, it finds itself advancing and being established in faith without knowing how. The great virtues form in the soul and grow there by interior operations that are beyond knowledge. The soul is prospering best when it has no definite and limiting ideas of God present in consciousness, and it should not disturb itself with thinking whether it shall put its virtues into practice or not. This concern belongs in a lower stage of the spiritual life. All effort, all interior exercise, all sensible operations, all dependence on mental faculties, only disturb the real divine operation.⁶ "Sink yourself into naked, obscure [i.e. "pure"] faith in God and let yourself be annihilated in this divine abyss."⁷

By the middle of the century a sect known as the

⁴ It was printed at the end of Madame Guyon's *Moyen Court* of 1690, and is in the first volume of her *Opuscles Spirituels* (1704).

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 101.

⁶ *Ibid.* p. 105-106.

⁷ *Ibid.* p. 108.

Society of the Pelagini, from its founder Giacomo Filippo di Santa Pelagia, a layman of Milan, became widespread in Northern Italy. The members of these little societies met together for silent mental prayer, which they considered essential to salvation. They believed that they had found the only true way to God, and that having found the efficacy of the inner way they could safely dispense with the services of the ordained priests and with the requirements of the Church. Bishop Burnet of England, who was himself a man possessed of deep inward religious life and who followed with the keenest interest the stages of the quietistic drama on the continent, wrote from Italy that the Quietists were observed to be "more strict in their lives" and "more retired and serious in their mental devotions" than other Christians, though, he adds, "they were not so assiduous at mass nor so earnest to procure masses to be said for their friends," and he makes the further comment that "the trade of those that live by these things was sensibly sunk."⁸ The Inquisition set its forces in motion to annihilate the "heresy," but it continued to spread in secret and subterranean ways through the cities of northern Italy for almost a quarter of a century, and a very large number of persons became accustomed to and fascinated with the practice of silence.

This practice of silence and the full significance of quietistic tendencies came impressively to public attention in the seventies through the teachings and writings of a remarkable spiritual expert named Miguel de Molinos. He was born in Spain about 1627, received the degree of doctor of theology at Coimbra, and came to Rome sometime about 1665. He was deeply versed in mystical literature, profoundly influenced by the writings of Teresa, John of the Cross, and Francis de Sales, and already in this early stage dedicated to his

⁸ Burnet's Three Letters Concerning the Present State of Italy, 1688.

peculiar mission of inculcating the way of silence. He very soon became the most noted and widely sought religious guide in Italy, and he found himself the centre of a great spiritual revival, which was due not merely to his personal qualities but rather to the fact that he gave powerful expression to a tendency already well under way around him. Pope Innocent XI—the Pope of Browning's "*The Ring and the Book*"—was intimately attached to him and gave him apartments in the papal palace. Persons of the highest rank and "honorable women not a few" sought for his spiritual direction.⁹ Bishop Burnet, in his *Letters from Italy*, says, "It is believed he hath above 20,000 followers in Naples alone." His popularity was extraordinary even before he published his famous *Guida Spirituale* ("Spiritual Guide"), which appeared in Rome in 1675, and which went through twenty editions in many languages during the next six years. This book came from the press with the approbation of five distinguished theologians of the time, representing the Orders of the Franciscans, Trinitarians, Jesuits, Carmelites, and Capuchins, four of them being also censors of the Inquisition.

We must turn now to the little book itself to see what Italian Quietism, as expressed by its most famous exponent, really was. Molinos declares in his preface that God is always communicating new light by continuous revelation to mankind. His infinite wisdom is never exhausted, human souls continually need fresh instruction, and so there will be new spiritual books to the end of the world. And in this endless list of new spiritual books his book is one which he believes God has inspired and called for.

In the introduction, Molinos describes the two principal states or stages of spiritual life, the first of which many

⁹ It is said that twenty thousand letters of consultation were found in his apartments on the day of his arrest.

attain; the second only few, because the way is very strait. The first stage is *meditation*, the second, *contemplation*. In meditation reason is operative, the attention is fixed upon the central truths of Christianity, the mind is busy with the mysteries of faith, the will grapples with doubts, and all the faculties of the inner self are employed in the effort to make faith and truth triumph over doubt and error. Contemplation is on a wholly different level. It does not begin until sense and intellect are left behind; until the soul has retired into its centre; until there is complete absence of thought, ideas, truths, images, all focussing of consciousness on distinct and particular objects; until effort and struggle of will have absolutely ceased and the soul enters perfect repose and peace, desiring nothing, seeking nothing, fearing nothing, resting calm and secure in pure faith, unselfish love, and wordless prayer. The soul is now full of joy, but knows not why; burns with love, but comprehends not how it loves.¹⁰ There is but one castle to which the soul can flee for escape from the storm and din and warfare and defeats of the world and where it can triumph over all enemies that beset it, and that is the inner castle, the interior fortress of peace, which no assaults can disturb.¹¹

He calls for a retreat from the world, a resignation, an indifference, an *ataraxy*, that in stoic temper far outdoes the boldest of the ancient Stoics. The soul must learn to do without any form of sensuous enjoyment whatever, without any tokens of divine favor or of divine love, without any raptures or ecstasies or visions, without the slightest sign that its passion and sufferings are appreciated:

¹⁰ The Spiritual Guide; Introduction, Observation II.

¹¹ Ibid. Chap. I. There is a very interesting passage in John Woolman's Journal, in which precisely the same view of prayer is expressed: "The place of prayer is a precious habitation. . . . I saw this habitation to be safe—to be inwardly quiet, when there were great stirrings and commotions in the world." Journal (Whittier's Edition), p. 236.

"Thou wilt experience not only that the creatures will forsake thee and those from whom thou hadst hoped most, but even the brooks of thy faculties will dry up so that thou canst not think—not even so much as to conceive a good thought of God. Heaven will seem to thee to be of brass and thou shalt receive no light from above.¹² . . . The soul must learn to walk in dark and desert paths, dead to passions, dead to desires, dead to reflections, accustomed to dryness and aridity of spirit, enduring crucifixion and annihilation of self-love and self-will without wincing or even asking why, 'until no news makes it afraid and no success makes it glad.' The soul must attain an annihilation of its own judgment, its own will, its own works, its inclinations, desires, thoughts, so that it finds itself dead to its own will, desire, endeavor, understanding, and thought; willing as if it did not will; desiring as if it did not desire; understanding as if it did not understand; thinking as if it did not think; without inclining to anything; embracing equally contempts and honors, benefits and corrections."¹³

There are two kinds of prayer; the one tender, delightful, joy-bringing, and full of sensuous comfort; the other obscure, dry, desolate, without response or joy. The first is for children, the second is for strong men. There are also two degrees of silence; the one a silence of words and requests; the other an absolute silence of thoughts and of all self-activity. It is only in this second stage of prayer and of silence that the Holy Spirit operates unhindered. It is only when there is total nakedness of self, complete death of self-activity, that the divine Presence is infused and works without disturbance or disquiet. Molinos insists, in the very words which Madame de Chantal had already used, that God will have all things done by the operation of His own activity, and that therefore the quieter *I* keep the better all things succeed.¹⁴ As love mounts, self falls, so that perfect love is utter annihilation of self, which is the only true miracle of sainthood.¹⁵

Strange as it may seem to a generation accustomed to

¹² The Spiritual Guide, Part I, Chap. VIII.

¹³ Ibid. Part II, Chap. XIX.

¹⁴ Ibid. Part I, Chap. XIII.

¹⁵ Ibid. Part II, Chap. VII.

hedonistic theories of life, this passionate stoic message, this call to retreat to a depth of silence below the silence of words, this gospel of unrestrained self-crucifixion, came to men's ears with a mysterious fascination and spoke to their condition like a new revelation. But its very success was its defeat. So long as it remained an abstract theory it did not much matter, but when it was translated into life and *marched* in practice, its dangerous import, from the point of view of the Church, was obvious. Its disciples—and they were very numerous—discontinued the use of the rosary and even vocal prayer, gave up confession, discounted the value of all external performances and exterior acts, and plainly showed a tendency to get on without the aid of priests or of the vast and expensive machinery of the Church. If God could be met in the silence of the interior retreat, what function is left for a priest, and if salvation was a matter of self-annihilation, how can the Church promote it? Was not this proclamation of the inner way to God, then, a preparation for a Protestantism in the south, as Luther's proclamation of salvation by faith had been for the north? Some of these Quietists, even the most spiritual and devoted ones, believed and taught that one single act of concentrated interior faith, one undivided assent of soul to the will of God, with no reservations and with no desires for self, one supreme act of pure devotion and prayer, would bring grace into operation in the soul so superlatively and effectively that it would continue through all the rest of time and eternity, like that water which the Samaritan woman sought, that she might not need henceforth to draw more. The guardians of orthodoxy saw the danger and determined to stamp out the movement, though the sympathetic heart of the Pope was with the new piety and with the man who had revived an intenser faith.

The story of the crusade for the extirpation of Italian

Quietism and the details of the process of hushing Molinos in the absolute silence of the Inquisition's solitary cell cannot be told here. The work was done by that force which "strikes once and strikes no more," and the danger of a new reformation by mysticism in Italian and Spanish countries was passed! Among the charges levelled against Molinos, including sixty-eight errors in doctrine, there were still graver charges of immoral practice. He was said by his inquisitors to have confessed to the view that it was possible for a soul in union with God to perform bodily acts of an apparently immoral nature, but yet without the consent of the spirit and so without any moral taint. He was further said to have confessed that he himself had committed improper acts, not suitable for repetition, but that as they were acts of his body, to which his higher faculties in union with God did not consent, they were not sinful acts.

These confessions rest solely on the assertion of inquisitors who were bent on making a case and who had at their command methods of torture which often wrung answers from the lips of their victims, though the words were denied as soon as the quivering flesh was released. The actual truth in this matter can never be settled, though I am inclined to distrust the moral charges against Molinos. But there can be no doubt that this extreme tendency of his to centre religion in an experience above distinctions was then and always must be a dangerous tendency. The moment "distinctions" are transcended on a level beyond good and evil, whether by Molinos or by Nietzsche, the very basis of morality has vanished, because the very life of morality rests upon a clear vision of distinction between higher and lower ethical issues, and upon a positive focussing of moral purpose and a definite choice of ends. No way of retreat to an inner citadel of peace, where the problems of the complicated world are transcended and where all acts become "in-

different," can be a way of genuine spiritual victory, and when the inner peace is won by the method of retreat, the lower instincts and passions, left without the guidance and direction of a sanctified intelligence, are only too likely to come into operation.

This stoical Quietism of Molinos, which looks so hard and stern toward the self, which seems in fact one long Golgotha of self-crucifixion, turns out psychologically to be a way beset with moral dangers and a way, after all, that misses the slow formation of a robust and virile sainthood. His panegyric on "Nothingness" is impressive in its note of simplicity and humility of spirit, but taken literally it cuts the central nerve of the spiritual life. "Look at Nothing, will Nothing, endeavor after Nothing; and then in everything thy soul will live reposed with quiet." "Plunge into Nothing, and there thou shalt find a holy Sanctuary against any tempest whatsoever."¹⁶

The merciless attack on Molinos led the Church on, by a natural logic, to a break with mysticism as a way of salvation and to a far greater emphasis upon the necessity of using the sacred channels of grace under the direction of the authoritative hierarchy. The persons who were attached to Molinos, or who were devoted to interior prayer, were hunted down throughout Spain and Italy, and the newer books that taught this inner way to God were as far as possible suppressed, including the writings of Juan Falconi. Among those who were caught in the great drag-net of the Argus-eyed inquisition was a blind mystic of Marseilles who was one of the early interpreters of Quietism in France, plainly a product of the Spanish-Italian movement. This was François Malaval, a refined and beautiful spirit and a man of true literary power. He was born in 1627 and lost his sight while still a child in the cradle, but by the assistance of

¹⁶ The Spiritual Guide, Part II, Chap. XX.

readers he received a classical education, and became possessed of an extensive acquaintance with mystical literature. Cut off from the beauty of the external creation, he set himself more and more to the task of exploring the inner world. After the prevailing manner of his time, he became fascinated with the quiet of the central depth within. He was a voluminous writer, though much which he wrote failed to get into print, but an extensive account of what he believed to be the true spiritual way was published in 1670 with the title, *La Pratique de la vraie theologie mystique*.

It is full of passages of fine psychological and spiritual insight, but its main message is an extreme form of Quietism. The soul must pass beyond visions and ecstasies, beyond words and sights, beyond thoughts and desires, beyond meditations even of Jesus Christ and His truth, and attain a pure, unitive state of consciousness, a pure love which is satisfied with loving, a hush of all voices, outer and inner, in which the soul penetrates beyond surface and husk, and flows into indistinguishable union with God. This book was put on the Index in 1688 and Malaval retracted the errors that were proscribed in his teaching, but even his letter of retraction was put on the Index as dangerous reading for the faithful. His book was, however, widely read in France and received Bossuet's condemnation in 1695, but in spite of this attack was republished in two volumes in 1709.

Another early interpreter of Quietism in France was Desmarets Saint-Sorlin, whose teachings are fiercely attacked and refuted in Nicole's rare book *Les Visionnaires* of 1667. This broadside of Nicole's against the "new heresies" plainly reveals the fact of a large quietistic movement in France and indicates the existence of groups of persons who claimed inward enlightenment, divine inspiration, and freedom to interpret the Scriptures in accordance with their inward Light, and who by the

way of interior silence expected to come into extraordinary union with God.¹⁷

One of the most famous, and certainly one of the most interesting, of the minor prophets of Quietism was the Flemish mystic, Antoinette Bourignon. She was born in Lille in 1616, a precocious child in intellect and in religious insight, though physically deformed and marked throughout her youth by strange moods. She inflicted ascetic tortures upon herself, had unspeakable raptures, enjoyed visions, heard voices, and finally received a "call" to "restore to the world the gospel-spirit," and she was told that she was created to guide men into a life like the first Christians and to make righteousness shine forth.¹⁸

The capricious and serio-comic incidents that make up the strange story of her formative years cannot be detailed in this brief sketch of her career. It would be difficult to find a more peculiar "saint," or a more bizarre "prophetess," or a more absurd claimant to the gift of infallible inspiration, and yet with all her oddities she was at her best and highest a wonderful instrument of spiritual revelation. She exercised extraordinary influence not only over the simple-minded and childlike, but also over persons of solid scholarship and rare gifts, the most noted of whom was the great educational genius, Comenius, who said of her: "Oh holy maid! Would that I might see her and speak with her once more! My science and knowledge and the books which I have written are the fruit of human argument and reason; but she has gained all her wisdom directly by the working of God's Holy Spirit."¹⁹ Of others who appreciated

¹⁷ Fénelon, in a letter of March 18, 1702, speaks of "many books on pure love" in general circulation. Heinrich Heppé in his *Geschichte der quietistischen Mystik* (Berlin, 1875) gives a large amount of valuable material for the study of the less well-known Quietists.

¹⁸ *Sa Vie Extérieure par elle-même*, and *Sa Vie Continué par Pierre Poiré* give much interesting biographical material.

¹⁹ Quoted from A. R. MacEwen's *Antoinette Bourignon* (London, 1910), p. 75.

her spiritual guidance and felt her power the most significant were Jean de Labadie and Pierre Poiret. Like her greater Quietist sister, Madame Guyon, she believed that God had endowed her with "a principle of fecundity" and had commissioned her to do a great work of "spiritual maternity" in the world and to bring forth through suffering and the agony of birth-pains many "spiritual children."

Antoinette claims not to have learned from books, to be ignorant of human science, and to have "received" inwardly by inspiration, or rather by dictation, all that she knows, but her writings show large familiarity with the great and lesser mystics and she was evidently quick to select and absorb any suggestion or truth which fitted her body of ideas. She was apparently independent of the later Spanish movement and she is therefore an interesting parallel development of experiences and ideas, initiated primarily by the common influence of the master mystics of earlier times. She distinctly held the Augustinian conception of grace which comes immediately from God and which does everything for man's salvation when once he discovers that he has "nothing of his own." When all the faculties of the soul "lie still," the soul can receive "the pure light of the Holy Spirit." "Resignation" is the magic word. It means absence of all desires, abolition of preference, total dependence on God's disposing will, freedom from creaturely affections, and a merely passive and receptive attitude. "Resignation consists," she wrote, "in a cessation from all things, that we may receive God only. There needs no more than *to cease* and *to receive*; for all our cares and vexations or activities for things of this life are hindrances which stifle the operations which God would cause in our soul. We must be quiet and rest, that we may suffer the Holy Spirit to act alone."²⁰

²⁰ MacEwen, op. cit., p. 108.

She was a voluminous writer — far too voluminous — her collected writings making nineteen volumes (Amsterdam, 1679–1684). Her writings began to appear in English as early as 1671, and for more than a quarter of a century this strange Quietist carried on her work of “spiritual maternity” among a people whom she never saw. Her opponents thought she was a Quaker; the Scottish Assembly required all schoolmasters, tutors, and chaplains to sign a confession of faith disowning “the dangerous errors of Bourignonism”; but still she went on winning “spiritual children” and spreading the mood of repose and disseminating quietistic ideas.²¹

Before turning to the classical French interpreters of the movement, it will be instructive to examine its characteristic popular features as they appear in the experiences and ideas of two simple-minded and unlearned exponents of it. The mystics who have supplied us with material for the study of mysticism have been almost entirely mystics with a literary gift. Those who had no skill for psychological analysis and no biographical power to present their inward life may have influenced their little local circles while they lived but they have now no place in the line of torch-bearers, and we are too apt to assume that there were no mystics except those who wrote journals and books. As a matter of fact, the literary mystics form only a tiny fraction of those who had the great experiences, those whose eyes saw, whose ears heard, and whose hands handled.

Armelle Nicolas, a poor French servant girl of Brittany, who could neither read nor write, furnishes a remarkable illustration of the unexpected breaking forth of this type of religion in an untaught person, and it is only by

²¹ The most important of her “englished” writings are: *The Light of the World* (London, 1696); *Treatise of Solid Vertue* (1699); *Light Risen in Darkness* (1703); and *The Renovation of the Spirit* (1707).

accident that we know her story.²² Armelle was born in 1606. As a child she tended her mother's sheep in the fields, and at a very early age she was "inclined to silence and solitude." She had in these early years "infusions of sweetness and tenderness," moments of divine invasion, when God seemed present instructing her in the way of life, and from the very first she was profoundly touched by the suffering love of Christ and by a desire to bear His cross herself. Then came, as happens with all who travel the road of Quietism, a dark period of "stunning trials," both in the outer and inner sphere. Not only did the world fail her, but God seemed to retire and leave her to herself in grievous and insupportable anguish, facing the possible loss of everlasting happiness. Finally, one day in the fields, when all hope seemed gone, the love of God flowed round her, embraced her soul, filled her with unutterable joy, and created in her a passion to live henceforth to God alone. She set herself to the work of annihilating the creature, of killing self, and of eliminating everything in her nature which hindered God from acting in His own way through her. Pain, disease, suffering, came upon her in abundant measure, but she discovered that "it is better to suffer for love than to enjoy love," and she learned that she could continue in silent union with God as completely while working or suffering as she could formerly while partaking of the holy communion, which seemed at that time indispensable to her. Her ordinary meals became glorified by the real presence and "each morsel she ate seemed dipped in Christ's precious blood." In the bustles and hurries and hard labors of her daily pursuits she often felt the divine Light flood in and the holy presence touch her. Very often she seemed to feel another Hand guide her

²² The story of her experiences was written by a religious sister, in two duodecimo volumes of 550 and 350 pages. An admirable summary of this work was made for the use of Friends by James Gough and published in Bristol in 1772.

hand, and she sometimes learned more in one day than men of the world could have taught her in a year.²³ "I am," she said, "never less alone than when I seem most alone." Silence seemed to her the most precious and efficacious way to union with God. The soul must cease its converse with all that is of the creature, must give up its eagerness for the news of this world, and learn to *centre itself within* in absolute quiet. So amply did this poor, simple girl partake of and practise the divine presence that the Sister, who tells her story, declares that there was something so divine and heavenly in her countenance and carriage that many used to say that, if they had no belief in God before, beholding the face of Armelle would have been enough to convince them that there is a God.

Nicholas Herman of Lorraine, a lay-brother of the Barefooted Carmelites and popularly known as "Brother Lawrence," is my other illustration of Quietism among the unlearned. He was born about 1610, served in the great world first as a soldier and then as a footman, and afterwards served in the little world of the brotherhood as kitchen-servant. He shows far more direct contact with the great exponents of Quietism than does Armelle Nicolas and he uses the technical terminology to a much greater extent than she does.²⁴ The existing material for a study of Brother Lawrence consists of sixteen short *Letters* by himself, a short collection of *Spiritual Maxims* embodying his views, four *Conversations*, probably written down by M. Beaufort and a brief *Life*, apparently

²³ This is a common expression of the mystics and indicates her acquaintance directly or indirectly with mystical writings. Brother Lawrence uses the more common phrase to express his experience. He says, "By faith I learn more of God, and in a little time, than I could do in the schools in many a long year."

²⁴ It is certain that Fénelon and Brother Lawrence knew each other. In the little sketch of Brother Lawrence (written probably by M. Beaufort, Grand Vicar to Cardinal de Noailles) reference is made to a visit which Fénelon made to Brother Lawrence during the latter's illness. Brother Lawrence also frequently refers in his letters to books which teach the method of prayer and the way to practise the presence of God, and he tells of other Brothers who have attained higher experiences than he has.

from the same hand. There is in everything that has come from Brother Lawrence a naïve simplicity that is perfectly charming and one feels that he not only talks happily about practising the presence of God but that he really practises it. "The practice of the presence of God" means for him the attainment of a state of "indifference" toward all finite things, a retreat into the inmost centre of the soul, an experience of absolute repose and tranquillity of spirit, and then a consciousness of the actual presence of God flowing through all his being and giving him inspiration, power, and guidance in all his activities, even those that are most commonplace.

He began his preparation for this great experience, which eventually became a habit, by highly resolving *to give the all for the all* ²⁵ by learning to do everything, even the turning of a griddle-cake, *purely for the love of God*, by forming the habit of calm silent repose and abandon, of caring only for God and nothing for matters that affected merely himself, and by acting on the faith that God is always present where the soul, created for Him, is emptied of other things and passionately eager to receive Him. Like all mystics of this school, he had periods of dryness and insensibility to pass through, when there was no *sign* of any presence given to him and when he had to practise his faith and wait for the divine tides to return, but through such experiences he cultivated his spirit of resignation and deepened the spiritual roots by which he lived, and in the course of time, like other Quietists, he ceased to be concerned about his "feelings," lost interest in the fluctuating states of his subjective "temperature," worried no longer about his salvation, gave up his desire for introspection, and lived in the unbroken practice of the divine presence. He found it

²⁵ First Letter. This is a well-known phrase in the writings both of Madame Guyon and of Fénelon.

unnecessary to be in a church or in the performance of religious ceremonies in order to be with God, for he discovered that he could make a sanctuary of his heart and have an intense and active union with God in his menial toil. Prayer became for him undisturbed and silent repose in God, dynamic and active, but marked by perfect *simplicity* and *pure* love.

So this good brother lived his eighty years, thoroughly human, rough, and awkward by nature, but made graceful and lovely by the work of God upon him, and slowly habituating his spirit, by faith and hope and love, to a perpetual practice of God's presence in his simple round of life; and "without any pain or struggle, without losing in the slightest the use of any of his faculties, he passed away in the embrace of his Lord," to be forever in the near presence of Him who had been the Life of his life. Many of his phrases are no doubt pregnant with the moral dangers that appear in such prolific measure in the fully developed stage of Quietism, but the simplicity and sanity and the joyous spirit of Brother Lawrence kept him in fine balance, prevented him from going all the way with his logic, and enabled him to live among the brotherhood with a shining face, with "a spaciousness of mind quite beyond the ordinary," and with his moral activities heightened rather than hampered by his quietistic views.

In France this movement found its most extraordinary expression — its prophetess, in fact — in Jeanne-Marie Bouvier de la Mothe Guyon, to whom we must now turn. She was born in the little town of Montargis, within easy reach of Paris, the 13th of April, 1648. She hovered between life and death for the first five weeks after her birth and continued frail and delicate and subject to recurrent illnesses throughout her infancy. The Bouvier de la Mothes were famous for their deep piety, "counting," Madame Guyon says, "almost as

many saints in the family tree as there were persons!"²⁶ and the frail little girl found herself born into an atmosphere of holy aspirations. At four years of age she loved to go to church, to dress as a nun, and to hear people talk about God, and she soon developed a passion for martyrdom. The first great religious upheaval of her life came to her when she was twelve years old through the chance visit to her home of a cousin, the Abbé de Toissy, who was on his way to Cochin-China as a missionary. She did not see him herself, but the mere story of the holiness and spiritual power of this missionary moved her so deeply that she wept the rest of the day and through the night, and this event was the occasion of her dedication to religion. She now discovered the writings of Francis de Sales and Madame de Chantal and by their help she learned to pray in silence, and in this stage of youthful imitation she endeavored to repeat the vows and the experiences of her model saint, Madame de Chantal.

Her nature was unusually intense, and in the period of adolescence a passion of love was born in her and swept through her entire being, but with all this wealth of love to bestow she found nobody on earth to love. A marriage was arranged for her by her father when she was fifteen, and this mystical, romantic child, made for love, was given to a dry and gouty gentleman twenty years older than herself, and sent to live in a home, dominated by a coarse, narrow-minded, cruel mother-in-law. The story of her sufferings in this dreary prison-home is a pitiful chapter, relieved, however, by the triumph of her spirit over the rude environment and by the way she used the daily crosses in the world about her to crucify herself and to refine her soul. Finding nothing around her to love, her love mounted like a burn-

²⁶ Autobiography of Madame Guyon, translated by Thomas Taylor Allen (London, 1898), Part I, Chap. II.

ing flame toward God — “I found in you, O my God, reasons for suffering which I have never found in the creature, and I saw with complaisance that this unreasonable and crucifying conduct was necessary for me.”²⁷

In her passionate search for a real and efficacious way to God, she found a succession of spiritual helpers, which shows how widespread in the France of this period were persons of mystical insight and experience. The first of her guides in the mystical way was the Duchess de Bethune-Charost, the daughter of Fouquet and an intimate friend of the Duke and Duchess of Beauvilliers, and the Duke and Duchess of Chevreuse, who formed an inner spiritual circle in the court of Louis XIV. “I saw in her,” Madame Guyon writes of this lady, “something that showed a very great presence of God, and I remarked in her what I had never yet seen in any one. I endeavored, through my head and thoughts, to give myself a continual presence of God. I gave myself much trouble and made no advance. I wished to have by an effort what I could not acquire save in ceasing all effort.”²⁸ The elder woman out of her experience tried to lead the younger one into the interior way and to instruct her in the use of silent prayer, but the latter was not yet quite prepared for the lesson nor was the teacher quite prepared to give it.

The return of her missionary cousin from Cochin-China, at this stage of her development, had a marked influence upon her life. She found that he prayed “in utter simplicity,” that is to say, he prayed without words and without any definite thoughts or requests in his mind. His whole being was concentrated in worship, and the power of the divine attraction closed his mouth and hushed all processes of thought. She saw in him too

²⁷ Autobiography, Part II, Chap. VII.

²⁸ Ibid. Part II, Chap. VIII.

a union of puritan sternness toward the vanities of the world with radiant joy in God. Her friend, Geneviève Granger — a spiritual mother — who understood by a native instinct the experience and the language of the mystical missionary, helped her to gain a clearer insight. Thus God, seeing her “toiling with her rowing,” kept sending her favorable winds to assist her on her course. By what seemed the secret force of God’s own action, a Franciscan friar, a man with much of St. Francis’ own spirit, came to complete the conquest of her soul. She told him about her spiritual difficulties and failures. Instantly he said, “The trouble is that you are seeking outside for what you have within yourself. Seek God in your own heart and you will find him.” “I felt in that moment,” she writes, “a very deep wound, a wound so sweet and delicious that I desired never to be healed of it.” A simple turning of attention, under the guidance of this man, worked the miracle of her discovery:

“I no longer had any trouble to find God. From that moment I was given an experience of His presence in my central depth. I was all of a sudden so changed that I was no longer recognizable either by myself or others. I no longer found my old faults or my dislikes. All appeared to me consumed like straw in a great fire. Nothing was now more easy for me than to pray. Hours of prayer were to me no more than moments. I was unable not to pray. My prayer from this moment was without forms, ideas and images [i.e. of any definite thoughts]. It was not a prayer of the head; it was a prayer of enjoyment and possession in the will, *a profound concentration without act or speech*. All distinctions were lost to give room for more expansion, without motives or reasons for loving. That sovereign of the powers — the will — swallowed up the two others [intellect and desire] and took from them every distinct object to unite them the better in it.”²⁹

Thus at the age of twenty, in the year 1668, Madame Guyon arrived, by what seemed to her a miraculous leap, at the first definite stage of her mystical journey. Like

²⁹ Autobiography, Part I, Chap. VIII. I have greatly condensed the account.

her spiritual teachers, the great mystics of the sixteenth century, she was impressed with the inferiority of visions, revelations, ecstasies, specific graces, distinct utterances, and sensible delights. The depth and centre of her soul seemed to her flooded, "by a continual influx," with the divine presence, without form or thought or image. Her faith, which absorbed her and conquered everything else, was "naked" and "pure," that is, it focussed upon no concrete facts or events or details. It mounted above distinctions to "a Light general, indistinct, undifferentiated, which appears darkness to the natural self on which it shines." Her prayer became a prayer of repose, of joy, and of possession. "I was plunged in a river of peace," says she; "I knew it was God who thus possessed all my soul, but I did not *think* on it, as a wife seated by her husband knows it is he who embraces her without saying to herself, 'It is he.'"³⁰

Her passionate love which had before found no object now rose upward "like an interior conflagration and secret fire." At last she had discovered what the soul was created for—a profound and tranquil and absorbing love of God. "I loved Him, and I burned with His fire, because I loved Him in such a way that I could love only Him." With this awakening of love came also eagerness for suffering and positive joy in crosses.

"I said, O my Love, I wish to suffer for you; do not shorten my pains, for it would only be to shorten my pleasures. . . . Crosses which before this I had borne through resignation now became my delight. . . . I was not surprised at all that the martyrs gave their lives for Jesus Christ. I deemed them so happy, I envied their good fortune, and it was martyrdom for me that I could not suffer martyrdom!"

Like Dante, she discovered how it is that souls do not desire to get out of the pain and fire by which God is purifying them. Such souls "remain in peace quite

³⁰ Autobiography, Chap. XI.

passive in their sufferings, without wishing to shorten them." Any process, however hard and painful, was welcome as a messenger of love, if only she could make it a way of annihilating "self," and of abolishing everything that was merely her "own." Senses, desires, intellect, will—all these were doomed to annihilation, but they proved to have a strange and subtle way of coming back in new guise.³¹

The period of this "first stage" lasted about six years—from 1668 to 1674. It was followed by another period—a terrible ordeal—of dryness and barrenness of soul, of stripping and despoiling of all that gave grace and beauty to life. She lost all sense of the divine presence of God, though in her first state it had seemed a permanent possession. She lost all power of prayer and "felt entirely void of God." All joy in things, either outward or inward, vanished. She was overwhelmed with a feeling of unworthiness and with an appalling sense of desolation. The entire basis and essence of her nature now appeared to her impure and sinful and "lost."

"Whenever I was alone," she writes, "I shed torrents of tears, and I said with equal dryness and desolation, 'Is it possible that I have received so many graces from God only to lose them; that I have loved Him with so much ardor only to hate Him eternally; that His benefits have served as matter for my ingratitude? His fidelity, shall it only be requited by my infidelity? Has my heart been so long filled with Him alone, only in order to be the more empty of Him; and has it been emptied of all created objects, only to be more strongly filled with them? On the other hand, I could not find pleasure in conversation, which I sought as if in spite of myself. I had within me an executioner, who tormented me without relaxation. I felt within me a pain that I could never make understood save by those who have experienced it.'" ³²

Everything of self-nature, everything that belonged to "the creature," or that bore the mark and brand of her

³¹ This account of "the first stage" of her spiritual life is based on Chapters IX-XII of the Autobiography.

³² Autobiography, Chap. XXI.

"ownership," seemed base and despicable and hopeless. She was banished from her own "central depth," and, like Noah's dove, could find rest and peace nowhere. The wrath of God seemed to envelop her and often made her actually crouch on the floor. "The killing pain," she wrote to Fénelon some years later, "which one feels when one loses the definite consciousness of the divine presence shows that one has not yet become perfectly *indifferent* and that one is still tied to *gifts* of God."³³ During this time of inward desolation and death she was passing through a series of outward events and happenings such as few persons of flesh and blood could have gone through and lived. She endured a continual slow fire of martyrdom from her mother-in-law, aided by a maid who used the most ingenious ways of annoying her. She lost by death her father, her husband, and her daughter. She saw her son turn against her and become more lost to her spirit than he would have been if he had died. Small-pox of a most virulent sort destroyed her beauty and all but took her life. Throughout these hard years she was the victim of one form of disease after another and often seemed at the very verge of dissolution. And yet none of these painful events satisfied her passion for suffering, and she added, of her own accord, strange bodily austerities and bizarre forms of torture to complete the crucifixion of the self.

Her "resurrection" from this state of death and despair came suddenly on July 22nd, 1680, and she found herself raised to a new life. "On this day I was as if in perfect life. I found myself as much elevated above nature as I had before been captive under its load. . . . What I possessed was so simple, so immense, that I cannot express it. It was then, O my God, that I found again in you ineffably all that I had lost. My trouble and pain

³³ M. Masson: Fénelon et Madame Guyon. Documents nouveaux et inédits (Paris, 1907), Lettre XIV.

were changed into a peace which I can only call God-peace.”³⁴ The human instrument of this new crisis in Madame Guyon’s spiritual experience was Father François La Combe, a native of Thonon, a Barnabite monk and at this period the superior of the Barnabites in his native town, whose life was henceforth to be strangely linked in destiny with hers. He was a man of quite ordinary mental powers and decidedly psychopathic. He had been sensual in his youth and had a period of perverted moral judgment, but he experienced a religious transformation, was profoundly influenced by the mystics whom he had read, and though not over wise and discreet, he became intensely devout.³⁵ Madame Guyon had already, at an earlier period, been impressed by his devout life and spiritual insight, and now he seemed divinely chosen to explain to her with authority that her state of despair, dryness, and desolation, through which she had just passed, was nevertheless a state of *grace*, and to show her that this was only a necessary round in the ascending spiritual ladder to bring her to the culmination of her mystical experience.

The third and final stage, upon which she now entered, and which was to continue to the end of her life, was, she believed, a state of continuous, perpetual union with God. According to her own account, her “own-self” was dead, her own individual self-consciousness was annulled, and “own-will” and “own-desire” were obliterated. A *God-me*, as she believed, took the place of her old *self-me*, so that her soul “lived in God as we live in the air without being conscious of the air.” An entirely new kind of consciousness, a new type of will, seemed to have come into being through a resurrection-life.

“It was as if everything had disappeared from within me, and a greater power had taken its place. I had indeed experienced in the

³⁴ Autobiography, Chap. XXVIII.

³⁵ The story of his life is briefly told in Jean Philipaux, *Relation de l’origine, du progrès, et de la condamnation du Quietisme* (1732), pp. 1-32.

times preceding my trouble that a more powerful than I conducted me and made me act. I had not then, it seems to me, a will except to submit myself with acquiescence to all he did in me and through me; but here it was no longer the same. I had no more a will to submit; it had, as it were, disappeared, or rather passed into another will. It seemed to me that this powerful and strong One did all that pleased him; and I no more found that soul which he formerly conducted by his crook and his staff with an extreme love. He appeared to me alone, and *as if this soul had given place to him, or, rather had passed into him, henceforth to become only one same thing with him.*"³⁶

She felt a sense of "infinite freedom," such as no one knows whose will is his own. Her soul rested in a state of absolute quiet.

"Nothing could interrupt me. Tempests made not the smallest alteration in my mind or heart. My central depth was in peace, liberty, largeness indestructible. If I sometimes suffered in my senses owing to continual upsets, *that* did not penetrate; they were only waves breaking on a rock. The central depth was so lost in the will of God that it could neither will nor not will."³⁷

There was no strain, no tension, no worry; her soul was in complete *abandon*. She no longer felt any leaning, inclination, or tendency — "my will was empty of all human inclination." Formerly in the first state, God seemed within her; now she seemed rather within Him, submerged in the divine Sea itself, pure, vast, immense. Her intellect, which at first appeared to be lost in a strange stupidity, was

"restored with inconceivable addition."³⁸ I found there was nothing for which it was not able. . . . I experienced something of the state the apostles were in after having received the Holy Spirit. I knew, I understood, I comprehended, I was capable of everything, and I did not know where I had acquired this intellect, this knowledge, this intelligence, this power, this facility, nor whence it had come to me."³⁹

³⁶ Autobiography, Part I, Chap. XXVIII.

³⁷ Ibid. Part II, Chap. VIII.

³⁸ See experience of T. Story: "He called for my life and I offered it at His footstool; but He gave it me as a prey with unspeakable addition, etc." Story's Journal (1747), p. 20.

³⁹ Autobiography, Part II, Chap. III.

In this third stage she was subject to extraordinary automatisms; in fact, to such an extent that she felt herself "moved from within" to all the decisions and courses which she took, and thought of herself as only "a passive divine instrument." Ideas, which she believed of divine origin, rose spontaneously out of her "empty consciousness," without any preparation and without any control of will. An interior Light seemed to flood her mind and move her to speak or write or act "beyond her knowing." *Spiritual Torrents*, her most original book, was written at Thonon automatically, by a movement which she could not resist.

"I set myself to write without knowing how, and I found it came to me with a strange impetuosity. What surprised me most was that it flowed from my central depth, and did not pass through my head. I was not yet accustomed to this manner of writing, yet I wrote an entire treatise on the whole interior way, under a comparison of streams and rivers. . . . Before writing, I did not know what I was going to write. As I wrote I found myself relieved." ⁴⁰

The most striking feature of this third stage was her consciousness of apostolic mission. It was impressed upon her, revealed to her, that she was a prepared instrument for the propagation of the Spirit, a recipient of special grace in order that she might be the apostle of a church of the Spirit.

"I became aware," she writes, "of a gift of God, which had been communicated to me without my understanding it, namely, the discernment of spirits and the giving to each what was suitable for him. I felt myself suddenly clothed with an apostolic state, and I discerned the state of the souls of the persons who spoke to me, and that with such facility that they were astonished and said one to the other that I gave to each that of which he had need. . . . I felt that what I said came from the fountain-head, and that I was merely the instrument of Him who made me speak." ⁴¹

⁴⁰ Autobiography, Part II, Chap. XI. She gives extraordinary instances of business sagacity, which she believes was divinely supplied.

⁴¹ Ibid. Part II, Chap. XVII.

In her own graphic phrases, she was endowed with "spiritual fecundity," "spiritual maternity." "I was," she says, with extraordinary boldness, "a participator in all the divine mysteries and I was associated in divine maternity in Jesus Christ. It was this maternity which caused me most suffering, for," she explains, "I can bring forth spiritual children only on the cross." She seemed, in this work of spiritual maternity, to be aware of all the inner conditions of her spiritual children, to be travailing in pain for their birth, and to be enduring all the purgatorial sufferings attaching to their sin or their unfaithfulness, and on occasions it seemed to her as though she was brought into such depths of divine experience that she became a channel, or "canal," through which divine grace, or the fountain of living water, flowed into the souls of those for whom she was travailing, so that "they experienced in themselves an inconceivable plenitude of grace and a greater gift of prayer."⁴² This "greater gift of prayer" seemed to her the supreme mark of spiritual attainment, and above all other callings she felt divinely called to the mission of perfecting persons to pray in silence and to receive grace without the mediation of speech or thought. As the soul advances to this highest state, it is able, she declares, to remain in absolute silence before God, while the Word of God operates in the central depth by ineffable speech above all articulation.⁴³ True prayer is thus a divinely initiated prayer, a prayer which God moves and directs in the soul.

There can, I think, be no doubt that Madame Guyon, in her period of "spiritual fecundity," regarded herself as "sent" to form and construct "an interior church" within the Church and to be the instrument of a far-reaching spiritual reformation.

"It seems to me," she wrote in an extraordinary passage which was suppressed from her *Autobiography*, "that God has chosen me

⁴² *Autobiography*, Part II, Chap. XVIII.

⁴³ *Ibid.* Part II, Chap. XX.

in this age to destroy human reason and to make the wisdom of God prevail on the ruins of human wisdom and of reason. He will establish the cords of His reign through me. His spirit shall be spread over all flesh and my sons and my daughters shall prophesy. It is I, it is I, who shall sing, out of my feebleness and humility, the song of the Lamb. . . . I shall become the corner stone of the interior Church.”⁴⁴

Father La Combe in a letter of August 20th, 1695, written from his prison, tells her that “the little church in this place” is prospering—he had said in a former letter that the Kingdom of God was being established there—and that she, Madame Guyon, is loved and honored by those who compose this interior group and who are in spiritual union with her.⁴⁵

Her period of “spiritual maternity” falls into three temporal divisions. The first division is the La Combe period, the second the Fénelon period, and the third the prison-period of quiet and obscurity. Father La Combe did not write his *Orationis mentalis analysis* (Analysis of Mental Prayer) until 1686, after Madame Guyon had expounded her views, and it would appear that he learned his doctrine of Quietism from her rather than that she learned hers from him.⁴⁶ She is throughout the period of their intercourse the dominant personality, though she was always more or less under the hypnotic power of suggestions from him. He could cure her of the most terrible pain or of a racking cough by a single word. They felt themselves completely united in interior life, so that the spirit of the one flowed freely into the spirit of the other, an experience which they called “correspondence,” and they professed to be aware of each other’s states even when widely separated by space. Through-

⁴⁴ This strange extract from her Autobiography is printed in Masson’s Fénelon et Mme. Guyon, pp. 1-12. It is more boldly prophetic and apocalyptic than my brief quotation would indicate.

⁴⁵ Letter XC in “La Correspondance sur l’affaire du Quietisme” in *Les Œuvres de Fénelon*.

⁴⁶ He very positively declared that he had no contact with Molinos, either directly or indirectly, nor had he read Molinos’ writings.

out this period, Madame Guyon exhibited striking symptoms of pathological condition and her own accounts very plainly show multiform types of well-known hysterical phenomena. She devoutly believed that she was divinely guided in the most minute details of her movements and her actions, and she saw a marvellous Providence in all the complicated affairs and difficulties that beset her, but the modern reader cannot fail to be impressed by the caprice and unwisdom and indiscretion of much that she did and of much that she brought upon herself in the period of her wanderings and her sufferings and her perpetual "persecutions." But notwithstanding this painful element of mental disorder, which is always in evidence in her life, there is a wonderful and almost amazing spiritual power equally in evidence. She had beyond question in some way found an *immensely expanded interior life, some new dimension of soul*.

It was during this period that she wrote her two most influential books: *Les Torrents Spirituels* (Spiritual Torrents) and *Le Moyen court et très facile de faire Oraison* (The short and easy Method of Prayer).⁴⁷ These two little books exhibit rare psychological insight and spiritual grasp. They show unusual literary style and power and they are the classics of seventeenth-century Quietism, though they reveal at the same time the weaknesses and the extravagance of the movement. It is a primary idea of Madame Guyon that there is a "central depth" in the soul, which has come from God and which exhibits "a perpetual proclivity" to return to Him, like the push of the stream back to its source in the sea.⁴⁸ All souls would return to their native Source, if they did not encounter the obstacle of sin, and therefore the main problem of life is the healing of the wounds of

⁴⁷ These two Treatises are published in her *Opuscules Spirituels* (Cologne, 1704), 2 Vols. She was a very voluminous writer and her complete works fill 40 volumes: *Euvres Complètes* (Paris, 1789-1791).

⁴⁸ See *Torrents*, Chap. I, Secs. 1-3, and IV, Secs. 1-8.

sin. There is, in her opinion, no solution short of the complete annihilation of the individual self in which sin inheres, the absolute spoiling of every particular thing to which the soul clings in its sundered selfhood. The soul must die to everything which it loves for self-sake, even to its desire for states of grace, gifts of the Spirit, supernatural communications, and salvation itself. The soul must get beyond the state of enduring crosses and sufferings because it wants God to see its devotion and its love, and it must learn to love and suffer and be crucified without knowing or asking whether He sees its devotion or whether He cares.⁴⁹ The soul must *let itself go* without thinking or willing or desiring. It must even get beyond doing virtuous actions, and reach a height where the *distinction* of actions is annulled.⁵⁰ But the soul loses its own powers and capacities only to receive an immense capacity, like that of the river when it reaches the sea. It no longer possesses, it is possessed. It has lost "the nothing" for "the All." It is perfect with the perfection of God, rich with His riches, and it loves with His love. It is one and the same thing with its Source. The divine life becomes entirely natural to it. It moves with the divine moving, acts as He acts through it, and its interior prayer is action.⁵¹

Le Moyen court is a powerful presentation of interior prayer as the heart of religion and of the life of union with God. Here again Madame Guyon has much to say of "the soul's inmost centre," of the profound interior depth of man, of "the native energies" of the soul. Here again also she shows an uncompromising stoical sternness toward everything that is man's "own" nature, everything that is individual, everything that is of the "creature." There must be a withdrawal from any dependence on the round of external forms and practices,

⁴⁹ Torrents, Chap. V, Sec. 19.

⁵⁰ Ibid. Chap. IX, 7-8.

⁵¹ Ibid. Chap. IV, 2; Chap. IX, 1-8.

from outward attractions and occupations, from all self-satisfaction and self-exertion, from the strain and effort of thought, from the worry and fret of activity, from everything that differentiates into the particular or focusses on the concrete. Peace is attained only when the mind comes back to its primal *simplicity* and leaves all that is distinct and sensible. It is when the mariners rest from the toil of their rowing and let the wind drive their vessel that they reach their desired haven.⁵² Pure faith, burning love that seeks no return, an interior silence, in which the soul retreats from everything that can be named or thought and sinks into its central depth, is the way to possess God, who is always present and always at home in this central depth as soon as one reaches it. This silence infused with the presence of God, this prayer which is the energy and fire of love, this hushed enjoyment of God with no straining for gifts or returns, produces a marvellous expansion of life and gives a plenitude of power for spiritual service, for it is now the Spirit Himself, the eternal word of God, that prays and moves and acts within. The soul that has attained this inward peace is not inactive or idle, rather all its powers and its multifarious interests, drawn into a centred unity, are directed by a divine moving principle which can accomplish more in a moment than can be accomplished by a whole life spent in the reiterated acts of self-exertion.

Father La Combe was arrested in the autumn of 1687, committed to the Bastille, and his religious views searchingly examined. He was sent as a prisoner to the island of Oleron and later to the castle of Lourdes. During the early stages of his imprisonment he continued his "interior correspondence" with Madame Guyon and an occasional letter passed between them. His mind, however, gradually gave way under his imprisonment, and confessions which in this mental condition he made of

⁵² Moyen court, Chap. XXII.

improper relations with Madame Guyon may well be ignored.⁵³

Madame Guyon herself was arrested in January, 1688, and confined in the Convent of St. Marie de la rue St. Antoine. Through the solicitations of Madame de Miramion, who had been much impressed by her piety, Madame de Maintenon became interested in the prisoner and succeeded in securing her liberation after an imprisonment of eight months. She made a very favorable impression on Madame de Maintenon and soon became a powerful influence in the inner spiritual circle of the court, though Louis XIV warned his enthusiastic wife that the lady's "sublime experiences" were "nothing but reveries."⁵⁴ It was at this time that Madame Guyon first met with Fénelon, whose future career and destiny were to be profoundly influenced by the crossing of their paths.

François de la Mothe-Fénelon, then Abbé, chaplain and spiritual director, soon to be tutor of the King's grandson and later Archbishop of Cambrai, was thirty-seven years old. He was a fascinating man, gifted with genius, possessed of grace, glowing with enthusiasm, fervent with religious passion, impressionable and credulous, a master of literary style, and eager for the deepest religious experience attainable. An idealist in everything and especially in religion, he was ready to recognize a saint as soon as he saw one in this wicked world, and he was soon convinced that this remarkable woman, with her depths of suffering, was an actual living saint. At the first meeting, however, which took place in the country house of the Duchess of Bethune, the "correspondence" was somewhat one-sided. He did not *fuse* quickly, but rather failed to feel the spell of her spiritual power and

⁵³ Accusations against the morals of Madame Guyon were very carefully investigated and no sufficient ground was found for thinking that her character was immorally tainted.

⁵⁴ Bausset's *Life of Fénelon* (London, 1810), Vol. I, p. 101.

seemed distinctly cold. There was no question, on the other hand, of the instant effect of the meeting upon her. She saw at once *that this was he!* She had seen him eight years before in a dream and God had given him to her then.⁵⁵

"It seemed to me," she wrote, "that our Lord united him in a most intimate way with me. . . . I felt inwardly, however, that this first interview did not satisfy him and that I was not appreciated (*qu'il ne me goutait pas*). I experienced, on my part, an indescribable drawing to pour my heart into his, but I found from him no correspondence, which made me greatly suffer. . . . After the second meeting the correspondence was more satisfactory but not yet quite free. . . . I suffered eight whole days, after which I found myself united to him without hindrance, and since then our union has gone on increasing in a pure and ineffable manner."⁵⁶

It must be understood that this "ineffable union" is what Madame Guyon calls "spiritual filiation," and this instance of it is the most striking example of her ministrations in "spiritual maternity." She cries in ecstasy, "O my son, you are my well beloved, in whom alone I am pleased," and she declares that there is no limit to her maternal tenderness for him. "I soon found," she continues, "that with an inexpressible joy I could pour my heart into his without seeing him or without talking with him. I felt that there was an almost continual flooding in of God into my soul and a flowing of my soul into his."⁵⁷ It is difficult for a modern reader to study this passionate document, which was omitted from her *Autobiography*, or to read the extraordinary group of letters which passed between Madame Guyon and Fénelon during this eventful year, without feeling that there was something more here than "mystical plenitudes" and "ineffable spiritual correspondence." It goes without saying that their intimate relation was free of moral stain. To Fénelon she was a saint, and she

⁵⁵ See Fragment of Autobiography, in Masson, *op. cit.*, pp. 8-9.

⁵⁶ Masson, *op. cit.*, pp. 3-4.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 5-7.

was invested by him with all the authority of a divinely guided prophetess. She always remained to him pure and holy. It was his loyalty to this faith that made him refuse to join in the condemnation of her and that involved his break with the court and the closing of his career. But in her there was unmistakably a neurotic element, which appears in Protean forms in her experiences and in her actions. She revelled in the unrestrained figurative imagery of the "Song of Songs." She was made for love and was restless in her hunger for it, and it must be said too that though she may not have had a distinct consciousness of it, she really enjoyed a glorious conquest. One can pretty plainly see the subtle conquest proceeding in these letters,⁵⁸ though the words used are "maternity" and "filiation." There are a great number of passages referring to the union of their souls and of their joy in each other. "There are moments," Madame Guyon writes to him, "when your soul is so near mine that I find no separation between."⁵⁹ And again, "My heart is always joined to yours."⁶⁰ Fénelon says, "I do not know what you do for others, but I know that you do much for me. I should be overjoyed if I could sit in silence with you;" and she answers, "I find you in God and God in you. The closer I am united to God, the more I find you in Him."⁶¹ "My heart pours itself into yours without difficulty."⁶²

Madame Guyon, it must be said, was deeply impressed with the feeling that Fénelon was destined to be a spiritual star of the first magnitude and that God had "great designs" for the restoration of the Church through him,⁶³ and, further, she carried in her spirit a profound conviction that she was "the canal of communication" through whom the Spirit of God was to flow and by whom He

⁵⁸ Letter LII.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid. LIII.

⁶¹ Letters XLII and XLIII.

⁶² Letter II.

⁶³ See Biog. Fragment and Letters XXXI and CVIII.

was to prepare His "chosen vessel." "My soul is like a fountain," she tells him, "which pours itself abundantly into the hearts of those who are given to me, until it makes them equal to itself in divine plenitude,"⁶⁴ and she says, again and again, that in a special and unusual way she is "a canal" between God and his soul or a suffering sacrifice for his purification. "I consent to be an eternal victim which burns before Him without ceasing for you. I hope you will know one day, either in time or in eternity, what God does by me for you. You will then see a measure of grace and of love that will ravish you."⁶⁵

The supreme mission to which she feels called is the cultivation in him of "pure faith," "pure love," union with God in silent prayer, and the absolute annihilation of "own-self."

"You must accustom yourself to walk by pure faith, which means to walk without *knowing* and without sensible feeling.⁶⁶ . . . Do not listen to your reason, or to the reason of your friends, but follow without hesitation the inclination the Saviour gives you.⁶⁷ . . . The soul must cease to walk by its own steps and enter the quiet of the Lord.⁶⁸ . . . The soul must let itself be *nakedly guided*. . . Go forward blindly and cease to trust the guidance of reason, even enlightened reason."⁶⁹

Pure love counts no cost, seeks no return, desires nothing, finds perfect joy in self-giving, is indifferent even concerning its salvation or its damnation, ceases to ask about its own perfection, but obeys, gives, sacrifices, loses itself without asking any questions. Pure love loses all thought of any good that belongs to the creature, any thought even of eternity.⁷⁰ The soul must be like a feather that moves with the breath of the spirit, or like an arm of a balance in perfect equilibrium and turned by the slightest touch, and without the constraint of preference.⁷¹ "God never says: This is

⁶⁴ Letter XXIII.

⁶⁵ Ibid. XXIX.

⁶⁶ Ibid. XVI.

⁶⁷ Ibid. XXIV.

⁶⁸ Ibid. XXXV.

⁶⁹ Ibid. XLI.

⁷⁰ Ibid. III.

⁷¹ Ibid. XXXV and XXXVIII.

enough of disinterestedness. The more one gives to God, the more He asks." The prayer of silence and of union with God is, she explains, a state of perfect *simplicity*. The mind is not occupied with any sensible image or any distinct idea. "All the faculties, all the powers of the mind, must be reduced to a simple unity,"⁷² which means a cessation from everything, not only from external things, which are the least of our distractions, but from all action of the mind. "There must not remain one stone upon another that is not cast down. But after this temple built with hands is destroyed, God will raise up another, not built with hands."⁷³ The soul that attains this perfect simplicity is beyond the need of means and mediums—"such a soul could live in joy, even though everything were destroyed and all the services of religion were denied it, for it would lack nothing essential."⁷⁴

For the attainment of this exalted state—"the eternal Sabbath quiet of the soul"—absolutely everything of "self" must perish and go to the wall—"you first die to everything without reservation."⁷⁵ One must go the entire way of self-loss and come to the state of complete abandonment of all that belongs to or attaches to the *me*. God wills to destroy all tendency to self-ownership. There must be no love other than for God, no willing except in parallelism with His will, no desiring except as He awakens it.⁷⁶ "God," Madame Guyon writes, "is so completely the Soul of my soul, the Life of my life, that I have no other soul, no other life, but Him."⁷⁷ And Fénelon tells her that he too is ready to go out, not knowing, not desiring to know, whither or how: "I feel the hand of God breaking all the branches on which my spirit seeks to cling, and plunging me into the dark abyss of pure abandonment."⁷⁸

⁷² Letter VII.

⁷³ Ibid. XXI.

⁷⁴ Ibid. XI.

⁷⁵ Ibid. XX.

⁷⁶ Ibid. III.

⁷⁷ Ibid. L.

⁷⁸ Ibid. XLVII.

Throughout this intense correspondence, Fénelon appears for the most part cautious and self-restrained. He wrote to Madame Guyon: "Take care that you do not go too fast, and that you do not take your own impulses for divine moving. Do not neglect necessary precaution."⁷⁹ He was plainly impressed by Madame Guyon's spiritual experience and by her knowledge of interior states. He looked upon her as an adept who, out of her abundance, was giving him light and guidance, and he afterwards employed many expressions and ideas from her letters to him, but he never quite cut his cables and let go of reason and judgment, and he never felt comfortable about the rigor of her extreme demands. Much which she wrote did not appeal to his taste, and he did not even read her *Autobiography*—that "temperature chart" of her inner life, as Viscount St. Cyres has called it,⁸⁰ though she strongly urged him to do so.

In 1693-4 the impending storm broke, and all intercourse between Fénelon and the great prophetess came forever to an end, though Fénelon's faith in her inspiration and his loyalty to the central truth of her message involved him in a conflict which shook all France and which drove him into permanent banishment from the court. Madame Guyon herself, after being examined for six months by Bossuet, was imprisoned in Vincennes, in Vaugirard, and in the Bastille. She was liberated from her final prison in the Bastille in 1703 and passed her remaining years in a quiet retreat at Blois, dying in 1717. Our last glimpse of her shows her patient, resigned, full of faith and love and forgiveness, believing still that her inner being was joined to God and that God was preparing "a little church of saints" through the method of simple faith and interior prayer.⁸¹

⁷⁹ Letter CXIV.

⁸⁰ Viscount St. Cyres' *François Fénelon* (London, 1901), p. 129.

⁸¹ See Delacroix, *Étude sur le mysticisme* (Paris, 1908), p. 196.

We cannot follow in detail the stormy controversy which ensued between Bossuet and Fénelon, at that period the two most distinguished churchmen in France. The "new mysticism" seemed to Bossuet to supersede or even to abolish organized established Christianity. He sweepingly condemned *pure faith* ("la foi confuse") i.e. faith which was without content and which focussed upon no object, either outer or inner, and which the Quietists were putting in the place of the definite ideas of Christianity and the positive articles of Christian doctrine. He wholly disapproved of "disinterested love," which loves without request or expectation, which is willing to forego even salvation and which substitutes a permanent inner state of beatitude for specific desires. He, further, condemned the substitution of orison—silent prayer operated in the soul by God—for the definite acts and efforts and practices approved by the Church.⁸² There were other reasons, of a less sincere and noble sort, actuating the great churchman in his battle royal against Quietism, but there can be no doubt that, unmystical as he was in temperament and hostile as he was to enthusiasm, he honestly conceived Quietism to be a dangerous substitute for real Christianity.

Fénelon might easily have allowed the storm to rage against the prophetess of the movement and he might have escaped its fury, if he had joined in signing her condemnation. This he would not do. He told Madame de Maintenon, who was never again to be his friend, and others in high places, that he found it impossible to condemn a person whom he believed to be both innocent and holy. He bravely wrote:

"I ought to be better acquainted with the real sentiments of Madame Guyon than all these who have examined her to condemn her; for to me she has disclosed herself with more confidence than she did to them. I have rigorously scrutinized her, and I have gone

⁸² Bossuet's États d'Oraison.

too far to recede from her now," though, he frankly adds, "I never had any predilection either for her or for her writings. . . . It seemed to me that she was naturally prone to exaggeration and without sufficient precaution."⁸³

The full violence of the gathering storm burst when Fénelon — then Archbishop of Cambrai — published his *Maxims of the Saints of the Inner Life*.⁸⁴ The modern reader finds it difficult to comprehend the immense stir which this little book created in those far-off days of war and diplomacy and fashion, but for a time nobody talked of anything else. The king ordered Fénelon to leave Versailles, and all the influence of this most Christian king was brought into play to secure in the Vatican the condemnation of the "Maxims."

It must, however, be admitted that the "Maxims" was an unwise book for the occasion and an extreme expression of quietistic mysticism for any age, though it is possible for the present-day reader to realize that Fénelon was aiming at a lofty and genuine type of inward religion. The deep and ineradicable difficulty with this entire formulation of the spiritual life is its inability to get out of the dark region of negation into the real world of concrete experience and moral action. "Pure contemplation," he says, "is negative. It is not occupied with any sensible image nor with any distinct idea of God."⁸⁵ Sanctification is the attainment of the state of holy indifference, of absolute non-desire.⁸⁶ The highest state of prayer is absolute passivity, complete repose, in which thinking, feeling, willing, are obliterated. The apex of human life is reached in a state of perfect *simplicity*, when the mind is focussed upon no object, when the will aims at no goal and when the soul does not like one thing better than another thing, but is as a

⁸³ Letter CII in "Correspondance sur l'affaire du Quietisme." Œuvres de Fénelon, Tome IX. See also Bausset's *Life of Fénelon*, Vol. I, pp. 134-147.

⁸⁴ *Explication des Maxims des Saints sur la Vie intérieure* (1697).

⁸⁵ *Maxims*, Chap. XXVII.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.* Chaps. V and VI.

feather blown by the wind of grace. Love is then first pure love when it loves no particular thing or object, when it loves for the sheer sake of loving and asks for no return.

Beneath all this numbing negation and glorifying of the abstract, there throbs, however, everywhere through the book the real passion of this exalted soul for union of heart with God, for a re-living of the Christ-Life and for positive coöperation with the Spirit, inwardly experienced. He was earnestly endeavoring to wash selfishness and self-seeking out of religion, to show how to avoid the eager strain and over-busy activity that characterize Christian people, and to emphasize the truth that God would become the supreme factor of our lives if we could only learn how to keep ourselves in the currents of His Life instead of across them.

The extraordinary insight of Fénelon, however, and the rare sanity of his spiritual counsel appear at their best in his *Spiritual Letters*. His power of psychological analysis of states and conditions, and his frank way of telling the distinguished women who consulted him, the laws of physical and spiritual health, are remarkable for that age and would be for any age. "No peace is to be looked for," he tells one of his correspondents, "so long as we are at the mercy of greedy, insatiable longings, trying to satisfy that 'me' of ours which is touchy over everything that concerns it"—so long as we nurse "a sickly self-love which cannot be touched without screaming."⁸⁷ There must be, he insists, a relentless and deadly war with this cruel enemy of our peace, our own *self*. There must be no softness, no truce, until this enemy is annihilated. "The more absolute the self-renunciation, the deeper the peace."⁸⁸

He is very keen to detect the signs of morbid temperament and the illusions which haunt a soul that is a prey

⁸⁷ Letter XXVIII.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

to over-fine scruples. "You are too skillful in tormenting yourself about nothing," he tells one of his consultants. "You dry up the sources of prayer under the pretext of hunting out infinitesimal faults. You distract and perplex yourself with your self-investigations. You indulge in anxious search after trifling faults which you magnify in your imagination."⁸⁹ To such souls he prescribes relaxation of strain and striving, the healing rest of silent prayer, the realization of the continual presence of God, and absolute confidence in the love of God: "Trust to love; it takes all, but it gives all."⁹⁰ He finds his letter-writers too restless and active in their religious life, too eager for the attainment of inner states, and too anxious for a religious reputation. The wise advice is, "Try to soothe yourself in silence before God, as the mother soothes the child that is sobbing on her knees."⁹¹ Get absorbed in the love of God, follow your heart in its deepest leadings, and you will be less eager to please men and so will really please them more.⁹²

He is always telling his correspondents, who want to get out of the world in order to lead the saintly life, that this expectation is a delusion. Saintliness is not to be sought in some world apart from pain and care and annoyances; it is to be found, if anywhere, in the midst of daily duties, in this world where we must eat and drink and clothe ourselves, where we must get on with imperfect neighbors, and be subject to disappointments and defeats. God is everywhere within reach. One can practise His presence even while eating or dressing, and Love is more eager to bestow itself than we are to receive it. "God is often hidden behind disturbing conditions." "He is beside us amid daily annoyances."⁹³ He counsels another correspondent to stop useless reflections on the past,

⁸⁹ Letter XXXVII.

⁹⁰ Ibid. XXXV.

⁹¹ Ibid. XV.

⁹² Ibid. XXXI.

⁹³ Ibid. VI.

whether of regret or of complacency, to avoid unprofitable brooding, and to form, by act of will, the habit of practising the presence of God in the midst of necessary occupations.⁹⁴

What he advised his friends he practised in his own life, first during the strain and agony of separation from his old circle of friends, of bitter attack and of condemnation by the official Church, later during the heavy burdens of administering the complicated affairs of a difficult diocese, and finally in the supreme sorrow of his life, over the death of his beloved pupil, the Duke of Burgundy, grandson of the king, who seemed to Fénelon the one hope of the France of the future.

Fénelon exhibited a strange mingling of the man of the world and the saint, the rational thinker and the Quietist absorbed in God, the ambitious churchman and the lover of the crucifying cross of Christ, the persecutor of heretics and the gentle apostle of soul-freedom, the ingenious casuist and the sincere spirit who would not at any cost desert the woman who had convinced him that she was a holy person. He is one of the noblest illustrations in the seventeenth century of the impossibility of successfully solving the problem of spiritual life on the assumption that human nature—the natural man—is absolutely corrupt and depraved, and that God can triumph in the soul only when the human powers have been annihilated, the assumption that God is all only when man is nothing. Fénelon himself has put this condition in striking fashion: “As the sacristan at the end of the service snuffs out the altar candles one after another, so must grace put out our natural life, and as his extinguisher, ill-applied, leaves behind it a guttering spark that melts the wax, so will it be with us if one single spark of natural life remains.”⁹⁵ That condition underlies all the vagaries and mistakes of Quietism, and it presents, wherever it

⁹⁴ Letter CXXXIII.

⁹⁵ Spiritual Letter, No. CCIII.

appears, an *impasse* in the way of the spiritual life. If ever two souls have passionately tried to go that hard road, have ever attained the enduring, stoical-christian temper, have ever been ready to crucify "the me," and have ever been eager to have God all and themselves nothing, it was these two French Quietists of the seventeenth century—Madame Guyon and François Fénelon; but nothing is more clear than that they succeeded in so far as they retained and ennobled their concrete personalities and their interesting individual characteristics, and that they failed in so far as they suppressed and annihilated themselves and arrived at abstract love, non-desire, and no-willing.

The entire movement—certainly one of the most extraordinary Odysseys of the inner world ever undertaken by man—was a bold venture of the soul to find a direct way from the failure and ruin of the finite self to complete recovery through union with the Infinite. Whether consciously or unconsciously, it was an attempt to do away with priests and mediators, to find salvation in its purest and loftiest degree without a single external help, to prove that the only realities in the universe that count are God and the soul, and that they are so near that they can become one. Most of the great Quietists reviewed here were Roman Catholics, but, perhaps without knowing it, they were at heart as much protestant as Luther. They were striving, often through most intense suffering, to put the key to all spiritual attainments into the hand of the individual and to inaugurate by a new and living way the invisible church of the Spirit. It is a strange story, a Pilgrim's Progress toward a real city of God, but a story full of bafflement and tragedy as well as of noble, high-spirited endeavor.

The main actors themselves, with all their sincerity and honesty of purpose, were sometimes lacking in plain, ordinary wisdom. They blundered. But it must be

admitted that it was a very difficult world of men and women for such a quest as theirs, and it was easy in that world of society to blunder. They were hampered too, seriously hampered by the limitations of their psychological theories and by their theological ideas which came to them out of the past. They had to work with views which they thought were true. They took for granted that man was a capital ruin, that the "creature" was devoid of any good. It was therefore their problem to find a way to bridge an unbridgeable chasm. How could grace operate in this human realm of utter depravity? The Church answered, Through the miracle of the sacraments. They answered, The soul can by one act of concentration withdraw from everything that is of the "creature," can centre down below all thoughts, desires, and feelings and come back to its pure origin in God. It can live henceforth in such a union with God that He acts in all the soul's actions, He loves in all its love, He is the Life of all its life. What they could not succeed in doing, however, was to make this "discovery" of theirs *work* here in this practical world. It was so far in to the "centre" of meeting, it was so deep down below all consciousness and the experience was so completely negative and devoid of content, that the individual could bring back nothing in its hands to show for its solitary journey. Quietism needed the warm and tender objective realities of the Gospel as filling for its abstract and empty fervor. It lacked some concrete way of turning its moments of fecundity into the permanent stuff of moral character and ethical endeavor. It was a noble *mood*, but it was too rare and abstract to be translated into real human life.

“GOOD WILL TOWARD MEN” (Luke 2 14)

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Professor Adolf von Harnack in the *Sitzungsberichte* of the Berlin Academy for December 9, 1915 (pages 854–875) has discussed afresh in his characteristically interesting and instructive fashion the textual criticism and meaning of the angels’ song in Luke 2 14. After a full exposition of the evidence and an investigation of the rare word *εὐδοκία*, he decides for the following text:

Δόξα ἐν ὑψίστοις θεῷ καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς
Εἰρήνη ἀνθρώποις εὐδοκίας,

which he translates:

“Glory in the highest to God and on earth
Peace to men of (His) gracious will.”

This form of the Greek text is in the second line substantially that on which the English Revised Version rests (“men in whom he is well pleased”); but Harnack, following Origen,¹ connects *εὐδοκίας* not with *ἀνθρώποις* but, by a somewhat harsh hyperbaton, with *εἰρήνη*, and interprets: “Peace is now given to men—no ordinary peace but *the peace of His gracious will*.”

Harnack’s argument, which contains much valuable discussion on various aspects of the verse, need not be here repeated. But two of the points which he makes, and in regard to which his reasoning is convincing, deserve notice; for although at first sight they might appear to occupy but a modest place among his results,

¹ Hom. 13 in Luc.; cf. Hort, “New Testament in Greek; Appendix,” p. 53; for the authentic Greek see Thenn in *Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie*, 1891, p. 486.

in reality they seem to offer the key to the serious textual problem of the passage, and so lead to a translation and interpretation quite different from Harnack's. They may be stated thus:

(1) With the reading *εὐδοκίας*, the song is a distich, of which the first line must be taken to include the words *ἐπὶ γῆς* and the second to begin with *εἰρήνῃ*.

(2) *ἀνθρώποις εὐδοκίας* is a phrase wholly unexampled and in itself full of difficulty. For *εὐδοκία* means "God's gracious will." It refers to His purpose, His choice, not to His approval or satisfaction with man's performance; and it looks to the future, to grace, to the hope of a needy world, not to the past, to man's merit, or even to the inherent worth of human nature.

In spite of the latter of these two observations, Harnack, as already indicated, holds fast to the reading *εὐδοκίας* instead of *εὐδοκία*, and overcomes the difficulties in the manner explained above, by connecting this word with *εἰρήνῃ* and not with *ἀνθρώποις* at all. Now the resulting phrase *εἰρήνῃ εὐδοκίας* is not quite so unexampled as the other, but the order of words which it requires us to assume is so strange that this exegesis is highly unacceptable and to most will seem impossible.

Since then *εὐδοκίας*, however construed, leads us into the gravest difficulty, we are bound to reconsider the question of text. What is the evidence for this reading in preference to *εὐδοκία*? The bearing of the facts has been somewhat altered by new discovery since Dr. Hort wrote.

(a) *εὐδοκίας* is the reading of B*~~Σ~~*AD (C is lacking), Origen, and possibly Irenaeus, together with the whole body of Latin witnesses, and the Sahidic and Gothic.

(b) *εὐδοκία* is the reading of all other certain Greek witnesses, including apparently Theodotus as cited by Clement of Alexandria (*Excerpta ex Theodoto*, 31, 1; cf. 74, 1f.). It is further supported by all Syriac witnesses,

including Tatian's Diatessaron (as quoted in the Armenian Ephraim), Syr. Sin. (Syr. Cur. is lacking), Aphraates, and Ephraim, and by the Bohairic with some other versions.

It seems unquestionable that both readings were in existence in the second century. Other things being equal, the agreement of B, other Alexandrian witnesses, D, and the whole Latin text, might on general principles be held to outweigh in favor of *εὐδοκίας* the combined testimony of the Syriac, older and later, and of the younger Greek text, which doubtless had its earlier history in the same locality as the Syriac translations. But are other things equal? Are we left to external evidence?

Transcriptionally, *εὐδοκίας* is not a "hard" reading such as would have led an ancient editor to attempt an improvement. It is only hard for modern critical exegesis or for a scholar like Origen. Superficially everything is in order, as the consistent tradition of all Latin translations conclusively shows. Neither does *εὐδοκία*, on the other hand, seem to be a "hard" reading. Yet there is one important difference between the two, often overlooked, which is here significant. Given *εὐδοκία*, it is of course necessary to connect *ἐπὶ γῆς* with *εἰρήνη*, not with the preceding words. But, as Harnack shows, this connection with *εἰρήνη*, in itself considered, without regard to the construing of the following words, would be the less natural of the two possible connections. A Greek reader who did not already have in his mind the concluding words of the verse, would be almost sure, as he read, to get the sense, "Glory to God in heaven (*ἐν ὑψίστοις*) and on earth." He would proceed, "Peace among men." Then, when he reached *εὐδοκία* (if he found that reading in his text), he would be compelled either to go back and change his exegesis, or, going ahead, to improve his text. From this point of view, *εὐδοκία* is

seen to be distinctly the "harder," and therefore preferable, reading. That seems a sufficient motive for the change to *εὐδοκίας*, and it is the kind of motive of which an ancient editor would have felt the force. If *ἐν ὑψίστοις καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς* went together, *εὐδοκία* was impossible. The change to the genitive was a solution lying ready at hand.

We recognize here "the work of careful and leisurely hands," displaying "a delicate philological tact which unavoidably lends it at first sight a deceptive appearance of originality." In other words *εὐδοκίας* is the reading of an early revision of Hort's "Alexandrian" type, which in this case has influenced even Codex B, but from which the old text of Antioch was free.

But the improvement had an unforeseen consequence, which from another side betrays it as a textual corruption. With *εὐδοκία*, the verse is a tristich, and is easily translatable into three lines of formal poetry in either Hebrew or Aramaic. With *εὐδοκίας* it has become an irregular distich, far less adapted for retranslation into a Semitic tongue. Now that Luke i and ii are a translation from a Semitic original is supported by many lines of evidence, while the contrary explanation—that Luke's Hebraisms are due to familiarity with the Greek Old Testament—seems to be forbidden by the not infrequent cases in which unmistakable influence from an Old Testament passage combines with independence of the LXX. This has been well argued by C. C. Torrey, "The Translations Made from the Original Aramaic Gospels," in the *Studies in the History of Religions* presented to C. H. Toy, 1912. In such a document it is a sound canon that the more Semitic reading (here *εὐδοκία*) is to be preferred to the more Hellenistic.

We may then say that the proof of the antiquity of the reading *εὐδοκία* from Clement of Alexandria, the Diatessaron, and Syr. Sin., has neutralized the external

evidence on which Westcott and Hort relied, and that internal evidence speaks decidedly for the text:

Δόξα ἐν ὑψίστοις θεῷ,
 Καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς εἰρήνη.
 [Ἐν] ἀνθρώποις εὐδοκία.

The absence of *καὶ* with the last line is no blemish; for the first two lines are parallel and require to be connected, while the third bears its own distinct relation to the pair. It gives indeed the glad reason on which rests the preceding exultant pæan: God's gracious will has at last been given effect for mankind; *therefore* ampler Glory is now ascribed to God in heaven, and Salvation is the happy lot of earth.

SIMON ZELOTES

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Simon Zelotes or Simon the Cananæan is one of the Twelve of whom it is customary to say that we know nothing except that his name shows that he had once belonged to the Sect of the Zealots or Cananæans, the "physical-force men" of the Jews, and that he had afterwards, seeing the error of his ways, adopted the pacific teachings of Jesus.

It is therefore somewhat of a shock to discover from Josephus that, if his evidence be correct, the use of the name Zealot to describe a Jewish sect or party cannot be earlier than A.D. 66. For this reason it seems opportune to bring together the facts dealing with the Zealots and cognate contemporary movements, and in their light to ask once more what is the meaning of "Simon the Zealot."

The usual assumptions¹ with regard to the Zealots are that they were the followers of Judas the Gaulonite of Gamala, also called Judas of Galilee, who founded in A.D. 6 what Josephus calls the "Fourth Philosophy" of the Jews. This philosophy insisted on the repudiation of any king but God, and in some modern books it is represented as having strong Messianic hopes.² It is also maintained that the Zealots are the same as the Sicarii or at least that the Sicarii are a branch of the

¹ Typical, for instance, is the statement in the *Encyclopædia Biblica*, on Zealot: "It is applied distinctively to a sect whose tenets are virtually identical with those of the Assassins, of whom they are indeed the forerunners." It can only be said of such statements that they reflect Schürer, not Josephus.

² It is sometimes held that The Assumption of Moses belongs to this school, but the evidence is slight. Moreover the figure of Taxo is by no means clearly Messianic, even if Burkitt's ingenious suggestion that Taxo(k) is gematria for Eleazar, be rejected.

Zealots, and it is often held that there was an almost unbroken succession of leaders of the Zealots, from Hezekiah, who preceded Judas and according to Schürer was his father, down to the fall of Jerusalem.

Hardly any of these assumptions is well-founded. With regard to Judas Josephus³ states that he tried to rebel at the time of the census of Quirinus with the support of a Pharisee named Zadok, after Joazar the son of Boethus, the high priest, had induced the people to submit to the enrolment. It is then that he goes on to say that Judas founded the "Fourth Philosophy," which agreed in all respects with the Pharisees except that it allowed only God to be acknowledged as king and advocated deeds rather than words.

All of this statement is entirely probable in itself. The taxation of Quirinus was a two-fold insult to Jewish prejudice: first, because of the repugnance which was felt to the idea of numbering the people; and secondly, because of the belief that the taxes payable by the Jews in the Holy Land were God's peculiar property. It is therefore quite likely that Judas had Pharisaic support. It is also quite likely that a form of thought was started by him and that it continued down to the fall of Jerusalem. It is even probable that much in the New Testament can best be understood as propaganda against this form of thought. But this does not prove that the Fourth Philosophy was identical either with the Zealots or with the Sicarii, and it certainly does not show that the movement of Judas was Messianic.

The clearest way of establishing the facts is to notice what Josephus really does say about the Zealots and Sicarii.

The Sicarii arose, according to Josephus,⁴ in the time of Felix. They were so called because they mingled in

³ *Antiq.* XVIII, 1, 6.

⁴ *B. J.* II, 13.

the crowd on festivals with a knife (*sica*) concealed in their clothes and assassinated their opponents. They killed first Jonathan the High Priest and afterwards so many more that a reign of terror ensued. In the same passage Josephus mentions two other movements, but clearly separates them from that of the Sicarii. The first was that of a band who claimed divine inspiration and led men out into the wilderness, "pretending God would there show them signs of liberty." Felix, however, thought that this was the beginning of a revolt, sent out cavalry against them, and cut them to pieces. Another rising was similarly dealt with by Felix, when an Egyptian false prophet collected 30,000 men, whom he led round from the wilderness to the Mount of Olives. It is very remarkable, especially in view of the well-known problem presented by the incident of Theudas, that in Acts 21 37 these three risings in the time of Felix are combined into a single incident.⁵ Josephus, however, clearly distinguishes them, though he mentions them together.

The later history of the Sicarii is that they formed an organized band which had its headquarters in the fortress of Masada near the Dead Sea under the leadership of Eleazar, a kinsman of Judas. This held out until after the fall of Jerusalem, and was finally taken by Fabius Silva, after the garrison had killed first their wives and children and afterwards themselves. Only two women and five children survived.

Those of the Sicarii who had not been besieged in Masada escaped to Egypt. Some went to Alexandria and tried to renew their opposition to Rome, but they were finally handed over by the Jews to the Romans. Others went to Cyrene; and one of them named Jonathan led out a number of the poorer class into the desert,

⁵ Οὐκ ἄρα σὺ εἰ ὁ Αἰγύπτιος ὁ πρὸ τούτων τῶν ἡμερῶν ἀναστατώσας καὶ ἐξαγαγὼν εἰς τὴν ἔρημον τοὺς τετρακισχιλίους ἀνδρας τῶν σικαρίων;

promising them signs and wonders, but the richer Jews informed Catullus the governor, who dispersed Jonathan's followers. He revenged himself by laying information against the richer Jews, and he and Catullus joined in a campaign of blackmail in which Josephus was involved. When, however, the matter came to the emperor, the plot was discovered, Catullus disgraced, and Jonathan burned.⁶

The Sicarii left an interesting trace of their memory in the Mishna⁷ in the law of *Sicaricon*, which was concerned with the settlement of the difficulty caused by property sold by the Sicarii and afterwards claimed by the original owner. It was clearly extended by analogy to other instances of a similar nature, but it is doubtful whether it originally refers to the time of Vespasian or of Hadrian.

The first use of the word "Zealot" in Josephus as the name of a party in Jerusalem is in *Bellum Judaicum* IV, 3, 9. After this he uses it frequently, and always in the same sense. It is the name arrogated to themselves by the followers of the famous John of Gischala, who had escaped with some of his followers when his home, the last place in Galilee to be taken, was captured by Titus. John came to Jerusalem with his followers and started a popular movement against the high-priestly families. He succeeded in procuring the election of an obscure person, named Phanneas, as high priest. It is quite clear from Josephus that the name "Zealot" (for he uses it as a technical designation) applies to John's following and to no other—a party equally opposed to the Sicarii, to the priests, and to yet another of the factions which existed in Jerusalem after 66, namely that of Simon ben Giora, who had once belonged to the Sicarii but had left them because they would not undertake operations

⁶ B. J. VII, 8, 1-10, 1.

⁷ *Gittin* V, 7.

at a distance from Masada. Ultimately he became captain of a large body of men and was welcomed into Jerusalem by the priestly party headed by Matthias in order to combat the Zealots.

It should be added that there is no reason for connecting the Zealots or even the Sicarii with any Messianic movement. It is true, no doubt, that many Jews were expecting the coming of the Kingdom of Heaven in a catastrophic form, but this view did not necessarily imply a belief in a Messiah and certainly not a belief in an already present Messiah. The first Jew who is known to have proclaimed himself the Messiah is Bar Cochba (A.D. 135). The belief that a leader was the Messiah must be distinguished from the view that he was an inspired person of supernatural power. Claims of the latter kind were far more frequent. Familiar instances are the Egyptian in the time of Felix,⁸ the Cyrenæan movement of Jonathan,⁹ or the still earlier movement in Samaria suppressed by Pilate¹⁰; but all these instances represent "false prophets" not "false Christs."

It is also desirable to protest that there is no justification at all for connecting either the Zealots or even the "Fourth Philosophy" of Judas with the brigand Hezekiah. This Hezekiah is mentioned in *Bellum Judaicum* I, 10, 4. He is called an ἀρχιληστής and his capture was one of Herod the Great's first exploits. His son, Judas, is mentioned in *Bellum Judaicum* II, 4, 1, as starting an insurrection after the death of Herod. But Josephus clearly distinguishes him from Judas the Gaulonite, for he says that Judas ben Hezekiah aimed at monarchy, while he is explicit in emphasizing that the other Judas refused to recognize any king but God. The founder of the Fourth Philosophy, however regrettable the results

⁸ B. J. II, 13, 5.

⁹ B. J. VII, 11, 1.

¹⁰ Antiq. XVIII, 4, 1.

of his teachings, may have been a fanatic, but was certainly neither a brigand nor an aspirant to a throne. Schürer's statement that Judas ben Hezekiah is the same as Judas of Galilee seems therefore quite indefensible.

Finally, a word must be said about a remarkable statement in the Jewish Encyclopædia, in which the writer on the word "Zealot" assumes that Zealot, or rather Cananæan, was the regular name of an order among the Jews who used physical force. The writer states that Clermont-Ganneau in 1871 discovered an inscription in the Temple, authorizing the Cananæans to kill any foreigners in the sacred parts of the building. All these statements seem to be misleading. The word "Cananæan" in the Talmud is applied generally to those who manifest religious zeal, and there is no more evidence in the Talmud of their existence as an order or sect than there is in Josephus. Moreover, the inscription found by Clermont-Ganneau is in Greek and does not mention the Cananæans at all.¹¹

Why is it that these facts have been so far overlooked that the name of Zealot has been given to the Fourth Philosophy? Partly because the word translated Zealot is not an uncommon one and represents patriotic virtue. It is used, for instance, in 2 Maccabees 4 2 and in Josephus¹² of the patriots in the days of the Maccabees. It is therefore easy to treat the word in the same way as, for instance, *Chasid* has been treated, and to find a reference to the party of the Zealots every time that a man is praised for being zealous. But there is no real suggestion that in any of these passages it is more than an honorable adjective. Far more important is the influence of the name of Simon the Zealot. It is obvious that the view that Simon was called a

¹¹ The part in question is μηδὲνα ἀλλογενὴ εἰσπορευεσθαι ἐντὸς τοῦ περὶ τὸ ἱερόν τρυφακτοῦ καὶ περιβολοῦ ὅς δ' αὖ ληφθῇ ἐαυτῷ αἰτίος ἔσται διὰ τὸ ἐξακολουθεῖν θάνατον.

¹² Antiq. XII, 6, 2.

Zealot because he belonged to the party of John of Gischala is not in accord with the traditional view of the Twelve, and therefore the theory arose that there was a party called Zealots before the last days of Jerusalem, and this was identified with the Fourth Philosophy described by Josephus.

Recognizing the facts as they are, the name of Simon the Zealot offers an interesting problem, which can be solved in more than one way. It is possible that we have all been wrong in translating the Greek of Luke, or explaining the transliterated Aramaic of Matthew, as "Simon the Zealot." Probably it should be "Simon the Zealous"; or in other words that there is no reference at all to any political party but merely to the personal nature of Simon. Another possibility is that the Evangelists made a mistake and really thought that the word which they found in their source referred to the political party of which they had heard, or possibly had read about in the pages of Josephus. A third and more imaginative but less probable hypothesis is that Simon did in point of fact join the party of the Zealots in the last days of Jerusalem.

THE FOUNDING OF THE CHURCH

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The church has come to have an enduring place not only in history but in thought. At least since the writing of *The City of God* it has decided some of the most vital questions confronting us because of a peculiar sanctity attached to it. It is not therefore out of place to demand from time to time that it show us its credentials. The present essay is an attempt to discover if there is anything peculiarly sacred about the manner of its founding that would justify us in ascribing unique spiritual authority to it.

And the surprising fact which we discover is, that we cannot discover any actual founding of the church whatever. We cannot be sure that the church was founded in any accurate sense of that term; it is probably more in accord with the facts to say that the movement which eventually became known as the church grew. Creation by fiat seems as mythical in this sphere as in more material realms. It seems as if there were a church almost before its members knew it.

In endeavoring to show that the founding of the church is obscure and to discover some reasons for such obscurity, we shall be obliged to see if we can trace the rise of the idea of the church in the minds of the early friends and disciples of Jesus. Of course ideas and words are never quite conterminous. A word never covers an idea. If a word is laid on top of an idea, the idea peeps out all around it. Yet at the same time before an idea can clothe itself with a word it is in a pre-natal state and cannot be said to be properly born. And so, it seems to me, our first, but not our only, duty in attempting to

come upon the birth-hour of the Christian church, is to discover, if we may, when the word "church" was first applied either by its friends or its foes or its members to the group of people who were held together by common devotion to Jesus of Nazareth, whom they recognized as the Christ.

Strictly speaking, there is only one thing to say: that we do not know when this word was first applied. But because we cannot know precisely, we are not excused from finding out all that we can know; because our sources are not all that we would wish them to be, there is no good reason for refusing to find out from them all that they have to tell us. We must therefore examine those early chapters of the Acts of the Apostles which contain virtually all that has even the faintest suggestion of being first-hand information about the earliest months and years in and about Jerusalem after the death of Jesus.

There are so few things that are certain about the authorship of the historical books of the New Testament that it is refreshing to come upon one of the few in connection with this book of the Acts. There can be no doubt that it was written by the same hand as that which wrote the Third Gospel. In the preface to that Gospel, the author virtually tells us that he has consulted various sources for information. The structure and language of the Acts lead us to the supposition that when he came to write the Acts he followed the practice he had used in writing the Gospel. Students of the book have fathered many theories concerning its structure, but they have had most to say about two sources which many of them have believed to underlie this work. One of these is the familiar "We" source, so called because of the sudden and unexplained appearance of the first personal pronoun in some of the later travels of Paul; the other has been even more vaguely denominated and it has been sup-

posed to underlie the first, say, twelve chapters of the book, which are devoted to giving us a picture of the beginnings of the church in Jerusalem. Harnack, who has recently made a valiant attempt to identify the author of the "We" passages with the author of the entire work, still admits Luke's use of probably written sources for the first portion of the book. The book itself cannot have been written of course before the last event therein narrated—the arrival of Paul in Rome. By that time, as the letters of Paul testify, the word "church" was applied as a matter of course to the local Christian communities. The author of the Acts, a Pauline admirer, would, therefore, be accustomed to use the word "church" for the various groups of Christian disciples of whom he was writing and in particular for the church at Jerusalem, which Paul so peculiarly revered. Under these circumstances, we must attribute either to a phenomenal intuition or to his sources the astonishing fact that until "the persecution against the church that was in Jerusalem" arose on the outburst and martyrdom of Stephen, we have only one single instance of the use of the word "church" for the Christian circle.

We hear of the filling out of the apostolate, of the descent of the spirit in the upper room, of the large addition to the Christian company through the inspired speech of Peter, of the first startling miracle performed by him and John, of the imprisonment of the apostles and their courage and release, of the growth of the "multitude which believed" and of their brotherly life, and though it seems to us the most natural thing in the world to speak of these events as the beginnings of the church, that notable word is not once employed. We are further instructed concerning the deceit and death of Ananias and Sapphira, of the renewed imprisonment and release of the apostles, of the strife between the Hellenists and the Hebrews, of the appointment of seven men to see that they were

treated equally in the distribution of food, of the character and genius of Stephen, of his epoch-making speech in the temple, of the rage of his hearers and of his martyrdom; and though we should expect the word "church" in every paragraph, it occurs but once as a designation of the disciples. And its occurrence is neither in connection with any of the pivotal events of these stirring days, nor in the heart of any of the narratives, nor in those wonderful speeches of Peter and Stephen, so full of verisimilitude and breathing the spirit of the most primitive Christian theology; we find it in what I think may, under these circumstances, be confidently regarded as one of those seams with which an author is accustomed to join together independent narratives. Just at the close of the story of the death of Ananias and Sapphira, and before the transition to the healing ministry of Peter and the imprisonment of the apostles, we read these words: "And great fear came upon the whole church and upon all who heard these things." This is the solitary use of that classic word in The Book of the Acts until the time of Stephen. Instead of this word "church," which we should have used constantly and which all our teachers use constantly in the retelling of these brilliant narratives, we find other words, much less pretentious, to us much less characteristic—"believers," "brethren," "their own company," and "disciples." Of these the word "disciples" seems to be the technical word or to be becoming the technical word for this untechnical group of people who were expecting their Lord from heaven. It might have remained such, had not, as we read, "the disciples been called Christians first at Antioch." Indeed until, in the last part of the eleventh chapter, after the conversion of both Paul and Cornelius has been recorded, we get to Antioch, whither certain men of Cyprus and Cyrene fled on the death of Stephen and where they preached the Lord Jesus to Greeks as

well as Jews, the word "church" is used only in the seams of the narrative. Even in those seams, it occurs but four times and save for the obviously editorial sentence, "So the church had peace," it does not occur at all in that portion of the early chapters of Acts which on altogether other grounds Harnack assigns to the ancient Jerusalemic source (behind which he places Philip as guarantor).

This peculiar state of affairs must not be dismissed from our minds until we have inquired whether it may have any historical significance for our inquiry concerning the origin of the church.

I have said that the word "church" was never used in the heart of the early narratives or in the course of the early speeches to describe the disciples of Jesus. But once in the midst of Stephen's speech we find these words: "This is he [that Moses] . . . which was in the church in the wilderness with the angel that spake to him in the mount Sinai." The word "church," though apparently not applied to the Christian groups in the earliest times, was applied by a prominent member of those groups to the Israelitish nation quite as a matter of course. That this is no mere accident is abundantly proved by reference to the Septuagint. Here we find the word "ecclesia," "church," used 71 times to translate "kahal" or its derivatives. It is also used 23 times in those parts of the Septuagint for which we have no Hebrew original. It is always employed as the equivalent of our word "assembly" or "company." It is the word usually employed to denote the assembly of Israel, in what we should call the ecclesiastical or exclusive sense. When, for example, we read that "an Ammonite and a Moabite shall not enter into the assembly of God forever," the word for "assembly" is the word "ecclesia." When it is said that "the transgressor shall be cut off from the assembly of my people," it is again the word "ecclesia"

that is used. I think therefore Harnack is on the whole right in saying (*Ausbreitung*, page 292): "In the Septuagint 'ecclesia' is the word by which 'kahal' is translated, the most sacred word for the entire nation, whereas 'synagogue' is used to translate 'edhah,' a more secular word."

It therefore seems proper to suppose that the reason why the early Christians did not employ the word "church" to designate their own gatherings is because they used it to designate the assembly of the Jews to which they still regarded themselves as belonging. And that the author of the Acts preserved this interesting fact in his sources may be due to his knowledge of the Septuagint from which his Old Testament citations are taken.

While the fact that the early disciples of Jesus still regarded themselves as "Hebrews of the Hebrews" is well-known of course to scholars, though not always duly appreciated even by them, it is widely ignored by most of us. This ignorance of ours makes it still difficult for us to do justice to the position and the emotions of that mother "church" in Jerusalem. It is, however, written clearly on the records that the early Christians "were daily in the temple praising God," that the apostles "went up to the temple at the hour of prayer," after they had seen the risen Lord just as they had before, that Solomon's porch was their place of assembly, and that they preached in the temple—and probably in the synagogues—as those who felt themselves there at home.

The old Latin prologue to Mark's Gospel asserts that Mark, after having become a Christian, cut off his thumb so that he should not be eligible for the priesthood. This tradition confirms the letter and the spirit of the early chapters of Acts, and indicates that to the Jews faith in Jesus as Christ did not disqualify a man for ritual service in the holy place so surely as the lack of a thumb. Nothing was further from the minds of the disciples than

to cut themselves off from the church or assembly of the Jews. Why should they take such a step? They alone among their people had been permitted to recognize the Messiah. Soon their leader was to descend from heaven to restore the kingdom to Israel and to choose from their group those who were to reign over the tribes of the nation. Would such a confident hope lead them to make less or more of those laws which had been given to prepare the way of the Lord and which they had kept in company with him? He was crucified not for denouncing the Jews but for claiming to be the Jews' prince. They had not separated from their church when they were baptized by John; thereby they had been only more surely admitted into membership of the coming kingdom of the Messiah. And when either at Pentecost or at the time of the earthquake they had been baptized with the Holy Ghost, they were not thereby separated from their people; they were merely given the power to bring that kingdom in. More than ever they recognized themselves as necessary to the redemption and to the exaltation of the Jewish nation. It was they who were to enable their countrymen to repent so that their sins might be blotted out and in consequence the Lord might be sent from heaven. Hence they called themselves "believers" as distinguished from their unbelieving countrymen, "disciples" as distinguished from crucifiers and mockers of their Messiah, and "brethren" as their Lord had indeed already called them; but the thought of cutting themselves off from the church of the Jews, the assembly of the people of God, did not occur to them for a long time. And until it so occurred to them, the church of Jesus Christ, in any accurate sense of the words, as distinguished from the church of the Jewish people, could not have been founded.

When we ask ourselves, therefore, regarding the founding of the Christian church, we ask ourselves to discover

the point of time or the point of consciousness when the Christian disciples regarded themselves not as a part of the Jewish nation but as a substitute for the Jewish nation, not as belonging to the people of God but as constituting the people of God.

And here it may be well to repeat the statement which was made at the outset and which I hope has become already better established. We cannot come upon any one moment of history when the church was founded; we cannot tell whether the church was founded; it is probably more in accord with the facts to say that it grew. For our sources do not record any final and explicit break of the disciples with the Jewish nation, though I think they do record such a change of their relations with the Jewish church at one particular point and perhaps also at one particular place that we may say that then the church consciousness, absent before, had arisen.

As we set sail upon our voyage of discovery, I am obliged to report that nearly all the works on church history have glided rather vaguely and ambiguously over the foundation of the Christian Church. They have not only failed to report the founding of the church whose history they undertake to narrate, but they seem to have been oblivious of their own failure.

And now, beginning our search for that moment when the early disciples regarded themselves as the holy group which had been substituted in the favor of God for the ancient people of Israel, we find five events which chiefly call for our scrutiny. It may also be said that these five events seem to stand out more or less vaguely to the church historians as somehow or other marking the beginning of the church.

The first of these events occurred while our Lord was yet upon the earth, going himself habitually into the synagogue on the Sabbath and regarding the temple as his Father's house. It is that solemn moment that

is set aside for us all from other moments of time, when at Caesarea Philippi, on a brief retirement from the confines of Palestine, Simon Peter recognized Jesus of Nazareth as the Messiah. Now there can be no question that that moment marked the definite recognition of the supreme authority of Jesus Christ, and that it helped to give to the words spoken on the mount and by the sea, to the parables of the publican and the prodigal and the ministering Samaritan, the carrying power through which they swept through—and swept out—the world. But does that recognition of Jesus as the Messiah amount to the laying of the corner stone of the Christian Church? There is no such thought in the earliest of the Gospels which report the event. Only in the Gospel of Matthew do we find an interpolation in the older account which might be construed in that sense. There we read that Jesus blessed Peter for recognizing him as the Messiah, and added, "Thou art Peter, and upon this rock will I build my church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it."

It is to this passage that those resort who like to call Jesus "the Founder of the Church." But there are three reasons which render it impossible to believe that we have here to do with such an event. In the first place, the verb is in the future rather than in the present tense. If Jesus is to be regarded as the personal Founder of the church, it must be at some future and undiscoverable moment. In the second place, the words, if spoken by Jesus, would almost inevitably have been treasured with his most sacred utterances. It is well-nigh inconceivable that Mark would have omitted them as too unimportant to mention, or that they would have found—as seems the case—no place in the Logia, the earliest collection of Jesus' sayings. The fact that the word "church" is never put into Jesus' mouth in the New Testament except here and in another passage in this same Gospel of

Matthew is very significant. And the second passage bears even more unmistakable marks of a late origin. There Jesus is represented as saying, "If a brother sin against thee and thou tell it to the church, and he refuse to hear the church, let him be unto thee as the Gentile and the publican." Not only the word "church" but the words "Gentile" and "publican" seem utterly out of place on Jesus' lips, in the significance in which they are used. Moreover the conception of Jesus' band of disciples as a disciplinary organization seems quite unhistorical. If Jesus used the words at all, the church to which he alluded was the Jewish Church and not the Christian one. And in the third place, we are confident that the recognition of Jesus as the Messiah does not mark the founding of the Christian Church because after that recognition Jesus went with his disciples into the temple and purified its courts, and partook of the feast of the passover with his disciples, as though they were all still members of the Jewish Church. In it, indeed, he had peculiar power, but to it he and they alike belonged. The break with the Jews had not yet come.

Weizsäcker and Bacon are at one in regarding Peter rather than Jesus as the Founder of the church. They regard him as such, however, not because of his recognition of Jesus at Caesarea Philippi as the Messiah, but because he was the first to whom Christ was revealed in resurrection glory. "He appeared to Peter"—this phrase out of the 15th of 1st Corinthians seems to them to point to a greater vision of Peter than any he had while Jesus walked by his side, and in virtue of which he became the founder of the Christian Church. Yet they hesitate to say definitely that the appearance of Jesus to Peter marked the founding of the church; the event was too personal for that, and, as personal, it has quite disappeared from the narrative of the Acts. McGiffert, who inclines to the belief that Peter was the

"second founder of the church" (*Apostolic Age*, page 48) does, however, single out another definite moment—of great importance in Christian history—for our attention in seeking for the origin of the church. "That Christianity has had a history," he writes (*Apostolic Age*, page 42), "is due to the fact that these disciples did not go back disheartened to their old pursuits and live on as if they had never known Jesus, but that on the contrary, filled with the belief that their Master still lived and conscious of holding a commission from him, they banded themselves together with the resolve of completing his work and preparing their countrymen for his return. Their resolve, put into execution when they left Galilee and returned to Jerusalem, marks the real starting-point in the history of the church." If indeed they came to any such clear-cut resolve, the moment of that resolve plays an important part in the gathering together of Christian believers, but that gathering would have regarded itself not as a church but as a favored group within the Jewish Church. Preuschen, who also emphasizes the place of Peter among the Christian disciples, seems better to express the facts when he says, "Peter gathered a company of like-minded people, but without giving up communion with the Jewish people and the Jewish faith."¹

The Day of Pentecost is the third great moment in the history of Christianity which has been hit upon for the founding of the Christian Church, which seems so curiously to baffle our search. Of all these moments it seems most widely chosen for this great honor. "While the apostles and disciples," writes Philip Schaff, "about one hundred and twenty in number, no doubt mostly Galileans, were assembled before the morning devotions of the festal day and were waiting in prayer for the

¹ *Handbuch der Kirchengeschichte*, p. 37. Das Altertum, bearbeitet von Erwin Preuschen.

fulfilment of the promise, the exalted Saviour sent from his heavenly throne the Holy Spirit upon them and founded his church upon earth. The church of the new covenant was ushered into existence with startling signs which filled the spectators with wonder and fear" (*History of the Christian Church*, I, page 228). And George P. Fisher, not quite so certainly, writes (*History of the Christian Church*, page 19), "With the day of Pentecost the career of the 'Church Militant' fairly begins." And Wilhelm Möller, still more cautiously, says (*Lehrbuch der Kirchengeschichte*, Vol. I, page 50), "The Spirit, proceeding from the Ascended One, not the earthly manifestation of Jesus nor his teaching in itself, is the really church-founding [element], yet even this [is to be taken] in the sense that the separation of this particular fellowship from the general religious-national fellowship of the Jewish people was first the result of a gradual process."

But the result of that outpouring of the spirit—whether it took place, as most scholars believe, on the Day of Pentecost, or as Harnack believes, in connection with an earthquake, during which Peter and John were released from prison—was not the founding of a church but the preaching to brethren of an already established church by those who were thus spiritually endowed from on high. So far was Peter, who was the spokesman of those thus filled with the spirit, from thinking that a new church had been founded and that he had been cut off from his people, that he appealed to his fellow Jewish Church members to hear the prophet of whom Moses had testified, saying, "Every soul that heareth not that prophet shall be cut off from among the people." Peter evidently expected that the Lord was about to purify that ancient church, which had been almost "since the world began." It is impossible therefore to think that the Day of Pentecost marks the moment when the disciples believed themselves to supplant the children of Israel as the

chosen people of God. They were reformers, not revolutionists.

The fourth event, of sufficient importance to call for a brief mention, is the choice of seven men by the early believers to see to it that equitable division of food and necessities of life was made between the Jewish and Hellenistic widows among the disciples in Jerusalem. It is hard for us not to use the word "church" in this connection, but it does not appear to have entered into the mind of the author of the Acts; "When the number of the disciples was multiplying," is the sentence with which he introduces the narrative. This incident was enhanced in its importance for a long time by the almost universal belief among church historians that it marked the institution of the diaconate, thereby regarded as the earliest body of which they had positive information in the early church. A more careful reading of the account, however, has brought to light that these seven men were chosen for a temporary and definite task, and that they are never once named deacons in the book which narrates their selection by the disciples. Their selection thereupon does not betray any church-consciousness.

There is left for our final scrutiny an event that is connected with one of these seven men who were chosen to oversee the distribution of food among the widows of the disciples in Jerusalem. Stephen had engaged in serious and keen dispute with the members of one of the synagogues in Jerusalem. It is not altogether clear what that dispute was about. But so fundamental was it in character that his opponents summoned him before the council and the high priest called upon him for his defence. Nothing can be clearer than that Stephen was recognized as a Jew in regular standing, and that he recognized the high-priest as the chief power in the church to which he felt that he belonged and concerning which indeed by that very title he spoke in the defence that he made before

the council. To him the church was still the Jewish church, the people of God. In his defence, he seems to have laid emphasis on two quite diverse points—the blindness of heart that had always characterized Israel, and the temporary character of all buildings made with hands, whether synagogue, tabernacle, or even temple. The report of his speech is too fragmentary for us to be certain concerning his thought. That he mentioned Jesus is clear, but precisely what he said about him we cannot tell. It seems, however, overwhelmingly probable that he set him higher than Moses both before God and in the church of the Jewish people. At the close of his defence the council and the witnesses stoned him to death. Thus they separated him from the people of God, from the church, in the manner prescribed in the law. The disciples were aware that he had been stoned for the convictions which many of them shared. It may be that the closest friends of Jesus did not agree with Stephen in what he may have said about the temporary character of Jewish institutions, for we read that the apostles remained at Jerusalem during the persecution which now broke out there upon the disciples. But a great number of the most loyal Christians were compelled to flee from the sacred city, under a virtual sentence of excommunication from the church to which they had up to that time given most devoted adhesion. The authorities of the church of God had denied their right to partake of the worship of the temple and of the privileges and promises of the fathers. What was to be done? In the Book of Acts we read: “They therefore that were scattered abroad upon the tribulation that arose about Stephen travelled as far as Phoenicia and Cyprus and Antioch, speaking the word to none save only to the Jews. But there were some of them, men of Cyprus and Cyrene”—of the very synagogue to which Stephen seems to have been attached—“who, when they were

come to Antioch, spake unto the Greeks also, preaching the Lord Jesus. And it came to pass that even for a whole year they were gathered together in the church, and that the disciples were called Christians first at Antioch."

The fact that in this short passage, which I have curtailed in citing, the infrequent word "church" occurs twice, has some significance, particularly as it occurs in the heart of the narrative; but the striking thing is that the disciples were no longer Jews either in their own eyes or in the eyes of outsiders. They were a new company, made up of Jews and Greeks, a new religious group, whose main characteristics were developed from their allegiance to a Christ, whatever that term may have meant to those who first dubbed them by the immortal nickname "Christian." But we can tell what it meant to the disciples. To all of them, whether Greeks or Jews, Jesus was the Christ. Certainly here has arisen the consciousness of being a peculiar people of God, of having a standing with the Messiah, which the Jews as such no longer shared with them. Throughout the book of the Acts we find a continual sense of the turning from the Jews, who rejected their own Christ, to the Gentiles, who accepted the Jewish Christ and yet no longer the Jewish Christ. For, as the Fourth Gospel has it, he had come "unto his own and his own had received him not. But as many as received him, to them gave he the right to become children of God, who were born not of blood but of God." Jesus soon ceased to be the prince of the Jewish nation and became "the Head of all things to the church, which is the fulness of Him that filleth all in all." The church was the kingdom of God; in it Jesus reigned; to it he brought his gifts. It was the saints in Corinth and Rome and Ephesus that were to judge the angels. They were in time past no people, but they had become the people of God. When this feeling arose, the word "church," heretofore used to denote assemblies which con-

sidered themselves sacred, whether of Diana in Ephesus or of the people of Jehovah, was naturally applied to the Christian disciples. It was applied at first perhaps to all Christian disciples in their capacity of people of God, but it soon became common to call each local Christian assembly by that name.

I do not wish to be understood as locating the origin of the church by detecting the presence or absence of any single word. The word "church" had never come in the Septuagint to have a strictly sacred meaning. For example, there occurs in the Psalms the phrase, "the assembly of evil doers," where the word which is translated by "assembly" in English is translated by "ecclesia" in Greek. We must by no means decide the origin of the church by the mere use of the Greek word for it. And yet I feel that, roughly speaking, the growth of the idea "church" among the disciples may be said to coincide with the use of the word "ecclesia" to designate their gatherings. And I find very great significance in Epiphanius' declaration — which seems to bewilder some of the historians — that the Jewish Christians rejected the word "church" as a designation for their gatherings in favor of the word "synagogue." They could not bring themselves to give their enduring allegiance to anything but the Jewish Church nor to find in Jesus anything but the Jewish Messiah, whom they were fortunate enough to recognize. I feel that Weizsäcker is right in affirming that the Christians in general would not call themselves a synagogue, because they believed themselves to be in possession of the kingdom of God and to constitute the church of God. "The church of God" appears to be the first name rather than "the church of Christ," because it was "the people of God" and not "the people of Christ" for which it was substituted (cf. Gal. 1 22, Acts 20 28, 1 Thess. 1 1, *Apostolisches Zeitalter*, pages 39-40).

But it is not the use of the word "church" upon which I would place the chief emphasis. It is used but 23 times in the entire book of the Acts, that is to say, infrequently even after the founding of the church in Antioch. It is true that while it is little used, and not used at all in most of the early chapters of the Acts where we should have constantly expected it, it is used constantly in the letters of Paul. But as I have said, we must not depend upon the use of a word to point us to the moment when the thing the word denotes arose. Our idea of the founding of the church depends in large degree upon the connotation of the word "church" for us. It seems to me that by the word "church" the early Christians meant the peculiar people of God. In Sohm's masterly *Kirchenrecht* the church is defined as "a gathering of the New Testament Covenant people before and with God." That they were His peculiar covenant people seems to have dawned upon them in Antioch, or going to Antioch, where they were first set off from the rest of the world as Christians at about the time when that nickname was first fastened upon them. Therefore it seems to me correct to say that the church—in the sense in which its first members understood it—was founded neither by the Lord (save as all things were believed to be under His control) nor by Peter, neither at Caesarea Philippi nor at the Day of Pentecost, but when, after the excommunication of Stephen, the disciples found themselves banished from the church of the Jews and yet not without God or hope in the world. It was founded in part by those who upon that persecution went everywhere preaching the word—and making a people out of those who had never been a people—and partly also by the council of the Jews who stoned Stephen as he was calling upon God and saying, "Lord Jesus, receive my spirit!"

If this be true, or in the direction of the truth, the

exact moment of the founding of the church cannot be marked off accurately, nor is it important so to mark it off. The church was an outgrowth of historical development and came into being through the opposition of the foes of Jesus to the claim of his friends to a place in the church of the Jews to which he and they had alike belonged and which was unspeakably precious to them all. Stephen and those who stoned him must be regarded as the most likely founders of the Christian Church.

These beginnings of the Christian Church justify two considerations. In the first place, neither Jesus nor his earliest disciples were separatists. They did not separate. They were separated by the authorities from the church to which they belonged. The love of Jesus for the Jewish Church, for its temple and its synagogues, is apt in our time to be obscured. He began his public career at Nazareth by employing the opportunity open to Jewish teachers in the synagogue. Among the events which brought about his death, his startling cleansing of the temple occupies a prominent place. To him the Jewish temple was a house of prayer for all nations, a place where all men were to find access to their God, as children in a Father's house, a place wide enough for him and inexpressibly sacred to him. He realized that the Jewish people needed a new conception of the mercy and loving-kindness of their God. But there was nothing further from his mind than the proclamation of a new God or the establishment of a new family. He appealed constantly to the Scriptures as an authority against the newer traditions of his time. He had no wish to separate from the Ten Commandments and from the twenty-third Psalm. He had only come to fulfil the expectations of men whom he regarded as the very spokesmen of God. One of the great problems of New Testament study is the degree to which he opened the

Kingdom of Heaven to any save Jewish believers. The God he revered was the God of his fathers; it was of that God that he believed himself the Son. We cannot of course conceive that he believed Jews only to have a duty toward God, but, unless our sources utterly deceive us, he believed that the highest duty men could have was toward the God of the Jews. A Bible without the New Testament is to us an absurdity; a Bible without the Old Testament would have been to him a blasphemy; perhaps we ought to say that any other Bible than the Old Testament was for him unthinkable. Be that as it may, Jesus was anything but a dogmatist; he was not beginning religious history *de novo*; the majestic utterances of the Jewish prophets were to him a revelation of the eternal God. Inclusion and reverence were the marks of his religious temper; the fanaticism and narrowness of come-outers seem completely foreign to his spirit; he came to expand and not to contract the boundaries of the family of God. I am sure that he would regard any holy fellowship as incomplete which did not include the sublime ethical monotheists from whom he sprang. What he would have us remember is that he died not by the Jews but for them.

And the second consideration is this: the spirit of Jesus was much more important to our Lord than the church of Jesus. With the one he would have identified himself; of the other he knew nothing. If we must choose between the spirit of Jesus without a church and the church of Jesus without his spirit, we will choose the former. Undue attention to the organization of the church and to its useful ceremonies has blurred, distorted, almost erased, the spirit of Jesus, which was before the church and is independent of it. There can be no doubt that history has justified by the stern law of necessity the gathering and the maintenance of the Christian Church. It embraces for us, as for the fellow-

believers of Stephen and of Paul, all people who believe on God through Jesus, His well-beloved Son, and who through that belief stand in a peculiar relation of intimacy with Him. But no more with us than with Jesus is the church the object of our spiritual allegiance; our supreme devotion must, like his, be reserved for God and men. And the ultimate purpose of our lives must be not to build up a strong church but to open the human heart through all possible means to the divine spirit of Jesus.

BOOK REVIEWS

WILLIAM WORDSWORTH. HIS LIFE, WORKS, AND INFLUENCE. GEORGE MCLEAN HARPER. Charles Scribner's Sons. 1916. 2 Vols. Vol. I, pp. xvi, 441; Vol. II, pp. 451. \$6.50.

This is a solid, engaging, and much-needed book, of a type commoner in England than in America, commoner in France than in either. It shows a German acquaintance with the enormous biographic material, a material probably more extensive than illustrates the life of any other English poet. But Professor Harper has such easy mastery of his sources, such ability to tell a story, such charm of style, and such attractiveness in his own personality, as to make it difficult to break off reading at the close of any chapter. Here we follow Wordsworth with eager interest through all his eighty years, attending him not merely from month to month, but from week to week, and at important periods from day to day. We watch the development of a human being much as if we were meeting him in the pages of a modern novel. Through letters he talks with us, his biographer supplying delightful comment. It is a piece of learned and imaginative portraiture which will form a veritable epoch in Wordsworth study.

Yet it will arouse opposition too, for it is a revolutionary book, setting aside the accredited sage of Rydal Mount and finding the true man and poet at Hawkshead, Blois, Alfoxden, and Dove Cottage. Half its pages are given to the years before 1800 which have only a subordinate place in the official biographies. The Memoirs of Bishop Wordsworth, Professor Knight, Frederic Myers, and their many followers have established a tradition of Wordsworth as an exalted, calm, ascetic, and holy being, pretty far removed from ordinary humanity. This mythical figure Professor Harper would recast. A changed scale of values is set up, a different emphasis given to old facts, and sundry important new ones are introduced. Wordsworth's remark, for example, that he wrote few love poems because he could not trust his passionate temperament has often been taken as merely another instance of his lack of humor. It looks more plausible when we read in his sister's letters of the illegitimate child left in France. While there seems to me some exaggeration in

Professor Harper's reaction against the conventional Wordsworth, I see that critical reconstruction was necessary and count it fortunate that it has been undertaken by a sober scholar who reverences and revitalizes the poet with whom since childhood he has lived in grateful intimacy.

Professor Harper regards democracy as the central principle of Wordsworth's creed and insists that in proportion as he followed this, or let it become obscure, he gained or lost power. In this I agree with him. In Wordsworth's early years he accepted a kind of democracy of nature, and never ceased to teach that the quiet eye can draw its harvest as well from common things that round us lie as from selected scenery. When on visiting Revolutionary France he at length awoke to an interest in man and society, he found the ideals of equality striven for there already familiar to him who had grown up among the freehold farmers of Cumberland. Accordingly, undertaking to exhibit in verse the workings of our elementary emotions, he naturally took his subjects from among the poor, the young, and the unlearned; and this not because he valued the peculiarities of these classes, but rather because through their very lack of peculiarities he thought them most representative of mankind in general. It was the same democratic thought which made it difficult for Jesus to imagine a rich man entering the Kingdom of Heaven. And might we not even conceive Wordsworth's famous warfare on poetic diction as but an attempt to carry democracy over into the field of language? Among words there are no fixed orders of nobility. All are good in proportion as they mean what they say. Vulgarity arises from pretence and emptiness. Plain words usually have the fullest meaning. Yet Wordsworth does not adopt a word merely because he finds it in common speech. His theory provides for selection, and in his practice he lets the "simple child" use "nay" for no, "the youth from Georgia's Shore" say that "the morning doth appear." No poet better or more frequently can charge a line with a shining word. Lucy's bones are "Rolled round in earth's diurnal course"; joy is "in widest commonalty spread"; the butterfly is "historian of my infancy"; and Myers has well remarked on Margaret's lost son, who sleeps "an incommunicable sleep." Such departures from usual speech are no acceptance of "poetic diction." They are functional, as poetic diction never is. Such words precisely fit their place. In bringing about the ease, naturalness, and conversational tone which distinguishes the poetry and oratory of today from that of a century ago, Wordsworth has had a considerable share.

Rightly then does Professor Harper lay stress on these democratic elements in the life and work of Wordsworth. Does he insist on them too exclusively? In his biographic poem, *The Prelude*, Wordsworth has made them fairly prominent. But this is not enough for Professor Harper. *The Prelude*, though written between 1798 and 1805, was not published until Wordsworth's death. Professor Harper believes — with some probability — that in the intervening years it was frequently altered. With less evidence he assumes that it originally had a more radical tone than appears at present. Émile Legouis, accepting it as it stands, finds in it a lucid account of its author's development. Professor Harper is convinced of a radicalism more extreme than it reports. He believes that Wordsworth felt in France the influence not merely of Rousseau but of the Encyclopedists. Their sceptical tendencies Professor Harper approves. Locke and Hume put English philosophy on the right road, and Wordsworth was fortunate in being guided along it from 1793 to 1798 by the great Godwin. Three times a brief remark of Coleridge is quoted, that Wordsworth "is a republican and at least half an atheist." Unhappily he grew timid and fell away from Godwinism during the struggle of England with Napoleon. He came to respect the institutions of his country, though in his championship of the Church Professor Harper thinks there was never much piety. He valued it chiefly as an engine of order. Wordsworth, in short, as Professor Harper sees him, goes over into blind Toryism. He loses touch with nature and the common man. He plays with superstitions, lives in comfort, is an officer of the government, and associates with the great. While his technical excellence increases, his poetic power fades; for he has abandoned "science" and democracy. He is in "a moral decline."

These judgments, while containing truth, appear to me harsh, unimaginative, and damaged by partisan bias. They neglect the complexities and half shades which usually enter into a great man's beliefs. No doubt it is difficult for a convinced empiricist to judge an idealist fairly. But there is a breadth and statesmanlike quality in Professor Harper which continually persuades me that he might be more subtle if he tried. Perhaps he has been irritated by early constraint. Toryism is not nice stuff for most Americans. But some Tories are not immoral, and sympathetically to examine the grounds of their strange belief is a part of the duty of a biographer.

All agree that the poetry of Wordsworth's later years is inferior to that of his earlier. But many causes worked toward this be-

sides Toryism and immorality. By the middle of his life Coleridge was lost, his brother John dead, family cares increasing, the excitement of pioneer work dulled, and the stock of natural imagery accumulated during his sensitive youth exhausted. How plaintive is his frequent lament that advancing age is substituting reason for the sensuous thrill of childhood! Wordsworth grew old early. Few poets hold imaginative fervor more than twenty-five years. Wordsworth did not, except in his sententious sonnets. But Toryism was quite as much the result of his decay as its cause. So Professor Harper often perceives, and from time to time mentions each of the contributory influences here named. But these make but a slight impression on his collective judgment. Wordsworth, he holds, reprehensibly abandoned the Godwinian type of democracy, and of course power soon departed. But did he abandon it? Did he indeed ever adopt it?

I believe Godwin's influence on Wordsworth has been greatly over-estimated, not merely by Professor Harper but by several previous biographers. *Political Justice*, published in 1793, was a popular book for the following ten years. Undoubtedly Wordsworth read it and found most of its teaching pretty familiar through what he had already heard in France. Godwin himself he knew, as a leading literary figure of London. But he never quotes his doctrines, even when in a letter his name is mentioned. Godwinism does not affect his verse, unless in its horror of war. Some passages in the later *Prelude* denounce "Reason" and "Analysis," and regret that the writer once played with matters so dangerous. But there is nothing to show that these abominable practices were suggested by Godwin, and Wordsworth returns to his hallowed "imagination" while still retaining the friendly acquaintance with Godwin intact. Coleridge certainly was for a time a disciple of the great agnostic; and at the height of his discipleship, in 1796, when he had recently become acquainted with Wordsworth, wrote to Thelwall, a forward member of the school, his hopes of a recruit — Wordsworth "is at least half an atheist." In lack of other evidence, to use this sanguine sentence as a cool estimate of Wordsworth's religious attitude is uncritical. Few writers have gone through greater changes than Wordsworth, yet few leave on their readers a deeper impression of unity. Wordsworth certainly approached religion by a path of his own. He knew and loved nature long before he loved man. His thoughts of God accordingly — ardent thoughts ever — reflect more of Him with whom nature is instinct than Him of whom history and philosophy speak. Only we must remember how near akin in Words-

worth's thoughts are the provinces of man and nature, and how spiritually nature is always conceived.

As regards Wordsworth's abandoning the principles of the Revolution, it is what most serious men of his day did. Those principles were seen to lead to bloody intolerance, anarchism, the invasion of republican Switzerland, and finally enthusiasm for an aristocratic conqueror. Wordsworth sympathized with England's struggle against Napoleon in the same way as today a former admirer of Germany sees the cause of civilization bound up with the overthrow of the Kaiser. No doubt in becoming a Tory Wordsworth was as extreme as was everywhere his habit, but he did not altogether abandon the love of liberty. Tory-democrats are not unknown in our time. In later middle life Wordsworth called himself "half a Chartist." His sonnets to Liberty are soul-stirring poems, written in large part after he ceased to be a Republican. Long after that change he lived among the peasantry, and never lost interest in the common man. I do not approve of his conservatism, especially his opposition to Catholic and Jewish emancipation and to the extension of higher education. But it is safer to trace these mistaken courses to the point where they connect with the very strength of Wordsworth's character than it is to refer them in a lump to moral decline.

Wordsworth was endowed with a double temperament. On the one hand, from early years he delighted in observing plain facts, in watching the multiplicity of things, the marks of individual character, the varied exhibit of the world's moving show. But no less strong, on the other hand, was his delight in seizing the underlying bonds which bring multiplicity to unity. His passion for finding law, harmony, beauty, order — always profound — is probably what has most impressed his readers. One of the many services of Professor Harper's book is that it brings the other, the miscellaneous, side into due prominence. Up to middle life the two remained in suitable equipoise. In *The Prelude* Wordsworth repeatedly tells us how the combination of them seen in Nature gave him a sense at once of nature's grandeur and freedom. When he first saw London he was struck with its chaotic multifariousness, was amused with it, and for the time content. Not until his second residence there did he discover an underlying unity, and so could grant the city a moral character. His experience of the French Revolution took an opposite turn. As he received its first impact, he was struck with the throb of hopeful aspiration throughout an entire people. Each was ready to sacrifice for the good of all. But as time went on, selfish-

ness supplanted patriotism; men clamored for rights of their own while refusing them to others. The principles of individuality and order parted company, and Wordsworth — how could that moral and aging man do otherwise? — threw in his lot with the latter.

Having thus sadly discerned that individuality may be a principle as well of evil as of good, Wordsworth is less disposed than formerly to furnish each person with a stock of knowledge and then leave him to direct his life for himself. Happiness does not come in that way. To most of us instinctive action and a wise passiveness — always favorite agencies with Wordsworth — bring more of it than conscious knowledge. Legislation even, clumsy and external as it is, contributes little. The collective wisdom of the past, custom, institutions, and selected men as interpreters of these august matters, are our best guides. Too much education, stimulating as it does the desire of each to realize his own novel ideals, is less helpful than the priest and poet, who lead us to idealize the realities about us. An easy creed for old age! Is it that advancing years bring timidity or wisdom?

I have developed here my divergencies from Professor Harper rather than my agreements and large indebtedness. A book is good as it forces us to rethink its subject and to adjust our minds to its fresh material. Such a stimulating book is this, and I bring it my tribute of grateful criticism. In scope, seriousness, and minute knowledge, it takes rank with Masson's *Milton*, Elwin's *Pope*, and Dowden's *Shelley*, having besides its own special distinction. Its rich scholarship never clogs its literary ease. In every chapter one lingers over passages of penetrative insight and felicitous expression. Professor Harper agrees with Matthew Arnold in counting Wordsworth the most significant force in English poetry since Milton. Most readers of this book will accept that judgment.

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THE DRAMA OF THE SPIRITUAL LIFE. A STUDY OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE AND IDEALS. ANNIE LYMAN SEARS. The Macmillan Co. 1915. Pp. xxvi, 495. \$3.00.

There are many approaches to the study of religion in our day. Some take the historical way, and study the rise and development of religion in a given race or in the race as a whole; others pursue the psychological way and investigate the nature of religious experience and the motives which explain its rise and the needs it fulfils. Still others are interested in its philosophical problems. The author of

this volume has not strictly followed either of these approaches. She takes now one way and again another. She is more interested in the problems of religion. She avails herself of the data presented by the students of the history and the psychology of religion, but her main interest is in the empirical nature of religion and the peculiar problems it presents for life and thought. She has been impressed with the paradoxes of religion, the strange oppositions and conflicting phases of religious experience, and she attempts a study of these for theoretical and practical purposes. She desires to determine the essential nature and spirit of religion, to correct current one-sided views, and to aid persons to live by and for a whole religion. She has a profound conviction of the greatness of religion and its imperative need in our day, if men would be true to their natures and would be saved to the things of the spirit.

Religion is grounded in the ideality of man's nature. His differentiation from the animal made possible and actual his religious experience. It lifted him above the sensuous; it made possible release from immediate necessity; it raised him above the spatial and temporal; it created an ideal world, and in this ideal world man's greatest creative activity is seen in his religion. Other needs and motives had their part in the development of religion, but the ideality of man's nature is the real fountain-head of religious experience. This makes religion an experience that is due fundamentally to man's rational nature. However much the emotional and the volitional factors enter into the life of religion, greater than either or both is the rational element.

If religion thus owes its rise to the ideality of man, the characteristic nature of religious experience reveals itself in oppositions, conflicts, even contradictions. The universal form of religious experience is the "triadic relation." There is the ideal of something good, divine, and eternal; there is also the keen sense of imperfection, incompleteness, and restlessness, and then there is a process or way of salvation, which, in redemptive religious experience, gives the sense of satisfaction, fruition, salvation. This is the fundamental form of religious experience; but there are certain other "oppositions" or "conflicts," which fall under this general scheme. These are the oppositions inherent in the very forms or types of religious experience itself; such as the mystical as opposed to the ethical, and the individual as opposed to the social. Then too there is another series of oppositions as to the source of the religious life, such as grace as opposed to merit, or necessity as opposed to freedom, or the inner as opposed to the outer. Once more, with reference to the form of

the spiritual life there is another series of oppositions, such as temporal and eternal, dynamic and static, and the many and the one.

These oppositions appear at times to be irreconcilable; they are taken by some to be contradictory; they are, however, not so in their true nature. They are only so, when the *one series* of elements is made the sole factor. If all are seen as parts of a whole, factors in a living teleological process, then each is seen to require the other for its fulfilment. They are different values in a perfect whole of experience.

It is in the discussion of these series of oppositions that the book has its original character and derives its special value. The author pursues these oppositions as they manifest themselves in religious experience in all ages and in many lands, and shows their analogue in the other experiences of life, and thus makes the religious experience a part of the total experience of human life. Likewise she shows how philosophy, ancient and modern, Eastern and Western, has been confronted with this oppositional character of our experience. In the philosophical portion of the discussion the contemporary tendencies have full recognition, though the author holds quite firmly and whole-heartedly to idealism, especially in its Roycean form; for all these oppositions are finally reconciled in unique selves, each fulfilling his meaning, each living his life in an ideal community and in relation with the Infinite and Eternal Self, the great Unifier of all selves.

It is this recognition of the ultimate spiritual reality that makes her dissatisfied with the many modern attempts to give the world a "religion without God," and in nothing are her critical powers and religious earnestness seen to better advantage. The same may also be said of her criticism of our over-practical emphasis in religion. The religion of efficiency is far from being the religion of the spirit.

This ideality of religion on the one hand and these manifold oppositions on the other, she finds abundantly evidenced in the literature of life and religion. Here is another special feature of her book. The material here gathered is richer in content, wider in range, and more varied in character than has yet been gathered by any other writer. She is more critical in her selection than James or Mrs. Burr, and more catholic in her range than Stratton. All workers in this field of study will greatly benefit from her wide reading. A perusal of this literature will justify her emphasis on the spiritual, ethical, individual, and social nature of religion, and save one from current crude notions of religion and counterfeit substitutes for the real thing.

Good as the book is, it cannot pass without criticism. And the first criticism concerns her use of the material. Not a little of the material is used two and three times, and now and again on opposite pages, as in quotations from Marcus Aurelius and Thomas Hardy and St. Augustine; material which belongs in one section is misplaced, as in case of some prayers under class III; in general it may be said that she gets lost in her materials, as in her long discussion on Romanticism, and the one and the many, and the section on the development of the religion of Israel and of primitive religion; also in her discussion of grace, which runs off into exegetical and doctrinal questions. This makes for weariness of mind. She has a suspicion of this herself, judging from the number of times she has to "return" to her subject.

Then again with reference to her scheme, her formula. It is not a little surprising that in a time when philosophical systems are at a discount, and theological plans of salvation are thrown upon the scrap-heap, we should have presented to us formulas within formulas of the process of salvation. Thus we have a "triadic" form of religious experience, and then a "series of oppositions," and then again formal logic lends its "serial and cyclic processes," and finally the perfect form is found in "rhythm," which is at once psychophysical, æsthetic, and cosmic. It is very well, if we can get a formula large enough and flexible enough for all our experience and material, but this scheme fails to do this, for it often requires the compression, transposition, repetition of the same material. This makes for confusion in the mind of the reader as well as in the mind of the author. Her own suspicion is expressed more than once that life is richer than formula.

Once more, her thought with reference to ultimate reality of the object experienced in religion is not quite clear. It wavers, it oscillates between the subjective and objective, the ideal and the real. On one page, she appears to believe in the ultimate reality of the object of religion, even to its personal nature and its highest interpretation in the terms of love, and in certain footnotes she is quite explicit on this matter. And yet in other places, the subjective meaning is intended, and great objective spiritual concepts like grace and prayer and salvation are so humanized in their meaning and reference that the divine reference is either minimized or ignored. If there were more clearness and steadiness of thought on these fundamental matters, the book would gain much in value. Perhaps the original difficulty comes from the fact that the author does not see that religion takes its rise, not from man's conceiving an ideal,

but from man's conviction that he is in touch and connection with ultimate spiritual reality. It is from such an experience that religion takes its rise and religious ideals are created. In the drama of the spiritual life the Divine Reality plays the leading rôle.

To careless reading or transcription such errors as these are due: the quotation from St. Paul on page 19, where "spirit of God," should be "spirit of Christ"; the verse, "If ye love not your brethren," etc., is quoted on page 347 as if it were spoken by Jesus. *Ereigniss* is misspelled on page 222. In the quotation from Shelly, "*pane*" takes place of "*dome*"; Professor Starbuck's book on "*The Psychology of Religion*" is twice given a wrong title; the Hindu prayer is not found on page 261, as stated on page 298, nor Augustine's prayer, as stated on page 318; there are also several sentences where the meaning is not in accord with the context, and the word "æsthetic" is sometimes used in the ordinary sense and at other times as meaning mystical.

DANIEL EVANS.

ANDOVER THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

THE FREUDIAN WISH, AND ITS PLACE IN ETHICS. EDWIN B. HOLT.
Henry Holt & Co. 1915. Pp. 208. \$1.25.

The author of this interesting volume is well known as an able advocate of the empirical, "realistic," objective method of studying the world and life, and as a consistent opponent of the subjective, introspective, *a priori* method; which he thinks open to the serious criticism of encouraging vague and misleading speculation and to have contributed little of real value for ethics or for human conduct. There will be many persons who, like the reviewer, will fail to recognize the stamp of permanence and all-sufficiency, of freedom from bias or from "wish," in the mode of looking at the truth advocated by Dr. Holt, any more than in that which he repudiates, and yet will find in this stimulating book, as in *The Concept of Consciousness* by the same author, a number of theses that should command admiration and attention. That the author's attitude is frankly materialistic will be accepted as an asset of value by some readers, and must be forgotten for the moment by the rest, if they would learn the lessons that the essay has to teach.

As in his former book Dr. Holt set himself the task of describing the emergence of consciousness among the progressive integrations of the unfolding series of "natural" phenomena, and of emphasizing, let us say, the more obviously objective aspect of the man—nature

(not man + nature) situation, so here he studies, in analogous fashion, the problem of "behavior," in its relation to morals, ethics, and religion on the one hand, and to the motor reflex on the other. Throughout the argument the string that ties the body and the acts of man to the body and the acts of "nature" is kept ever taut, so that the reader's thought shall never be allowed to wander very far away from the physical mechanisms that are taken as the earliest prototype of those organic processes which eventually figure as mental in the highest sense. As in all such demonstrations, a somewhat painful jolt is felt as one passes from nature (as here conceived) to even the simpler living organisms with their relatively complex processes of reaction and of choice. But this gap is bridgeable perhaps by the life of the organisms known as "tropisms," and its existence affords in any event no stronger case against the materialistic argument than is furnished by the difficulty of conceiving of a universe built on the plan of strict relativity, which natural science finds amply sufficient for its special needs and would gladly regard as sufficient for all purposes.

One is then led rapidly through the ascending series of organic reactions, in such a skilful fashion as to be almost persuaded that the principle of "integration," growing ever more elaborate though still mechanistic in its nature, is really able to account for all that man most prizes in the form of love, intelligence, imagination, and will. Indeed, no one can doubt that the transition from man to nature is of such a sort as to show the essential identity of the two; the only question is, Of what nature is the motive influence of both? Is it non-creative and one of a series of mutually convertible forces? Or is it — although so slender, shadowy, and invisible — an indispensable, irresistible, all-pervading, and really creative energy, of which the mind is the best example?

It is easy for any one who knows the sincere objectivity of Freud's work and is familiar with its keenness, honesty, and fearlessness, to see why the evidence he adduces appeals so strongly to the author of this volume; and those who, like the reviewer, are in warm sympathy with the psychoanalytic movement, have good reason to be grateful for the brilliant exposition here given of the "wish" and wish-conflicts, as constituting the essential element in human life. It is, on the other hand, a matter of doubtful justification to identify wishing with striving; that is, to interpret the wish only in terms of its outcome in accomplishment or as an attitude looking toward accomplishment. In doing this Dr. Holt seems to deprive life's conflicts of a great portion of their warmth and richness, and throws

aside the Freudian conception of the wish, in the interest of a scheme that seems to the reviewer needlessly narrow and artificial.

"Matter" subject to "law" can only "do"; it cannot "feel." And so, as the universe must be monistic, and as the most obvious features of it — so the author thinks — are "law" and "matter," therefore all feelings and emotions, and preëminently all wishes, must, in the last analysis, be classified as "motor attitudes," an assignment which to the ardent wisher seems anything but natural. But if the wish is thus limited in scope on the one side, it is accorded the widest possible scope upon the other. Construe its nature as one may, Dr. Holt is doubtless right in asserting that the wish, as described by Freud, is the proper unit of psychology, and that "the problem of good conduct . . . ought to receive some clarification . . . from a science that studies the mind and the will in their actual operation." He is certainly right also in asserting that the "wish," whatever else it may be, is closely related to the will. "Wishes conflict when they would lead the body into opposed lines of conduct. . . . And of two opposed attitudes only one can be carried into effect; the other is suppressed."

It would be difficult to make more clear than Dr. Holt has done the relation of these two sorts of wishes and the significance for education, and eventually for ethics, of learning how to come to terms with one's repressed motives. The literature of psychoanalysis has grown to be a large one, but the outline which is given in this book, while not in all respects such as Freud would probably endorse as adequate, is eminently illuminating and instructive. It is true also that to gain a dynamic conception of the wish, rather than to leave it as simply identical with sensation, is a real advantage.

Under the heading of "The Wish in Ethics," reasons are brought forward for preferring an ethics based on experience and having roots that extend back as far as one cares to go into biologic life, to systems of ethics "which posit an *abstract* sanction for right conduct" but "never discover *what* 'right' is." The ethics of this latter sort Dr. Holt refers to, somewhat sardonically, as ethics "*von oben herab*"; whereas the kind that he prefers, and considers to be the only system which stands in real touch with experience, and so the only one which is genuine and trustworthy, is that "*von unten hinauf*." But this judgment, although it has a real meaning, can claim no more solid basis of comprehensiveness than can the philosophic argument of the book itself.

It would be easy to write a volume in discussing, both adversely

and in praise, the many points, a few of which have been here alluded to, that are brought forward in this brilliant essay. But it must suffice to say that every student of human nature should read it for himself. The writers who have endeavored to construct a systematic theory of life and conduct based on the introspective method have often laid themselves open to very stringent criticism; and the world owes a great deal to the empiricists and the "behaviorists" for contributions of a lasting value. The representatives of both parties have still, however, much to learn, each from the other.

JAMES J. PUTNAM.

BOSTON.

THEISM AND HUMANISM. THE GIFFORD LECTURES for 1914. A. J. BALFOUR. Hodder & Stoughton. 1915. Pp. 274. \$1.75.

Mr. Balfour's purpose and method are well stated in two sentences of the concluding chapter: "My desire has been to show that all we think best in human culture, whether associated with beauty, goodness, or knowledge, requires God for its support, that Humanism without Theism loses more than half its value" (p. 248): "The root principle which, by its constant recurrence in slightly different forms, binds together like an operative *leit-motif* the most diverse material, is that if we would maintain the value of our highest beliefs and emotions, we must find for them a congruous origin. Beauty must be more than an accident. The source of morality must be moral. The source of knowledge must be rational" (pp. 249-50).

Fundamental to the whole discussion is the distinction drawn between the causal and the cognitive series of beliefs, that is, between beliefs which are more or less deeply rooted in the very being of man as part of the nature of things, and hence have intuitive probability rising towards inevitableness, and others which are the outcome of an intellectual process and have only logical validity. It is not to be deemed the mere cynicism of a man versed in public affairs to hold that in the last analysis all our beliefs are reducible to the causal series — "Scratch an argument, and you find a cause" (p. 61) — for science itself inclines to a similar deterministic declaration and thus gives rise to the central question of the book: If our beliefs are grounded in the nature of things and are therefore presumably coherent with it, how must that nature be conceived — in terms of Theism or Naturalism?

This radical inquiry, however, is not at the front in the earlier chapters which deal with ethics and æsthetics, and becomes insistent only in the discussion of knowledge. It is shown that the sense

of the beautiful cannot be accounted for by selection alone, since it has little or no survival value. And even if its highest forms have some vital significance, these æsthetic feelings would be injuriously affected if it were held that art is mechanical with no artist behind it, that nature is charged with no message of intrinsic meaning, and that history is only the record of a futile and irrational process. Æsthetics, that is, demands Theism as congruous context, and must inevitably languish in a mechanical setting. In the case of Ethics, it may indeed be shown that earlier forms had survival value, but the opposite seems to be true of the later. Loyalty, for example, as a sentiment, is essential for social existence, but the higher moral ideals to which it progressively attaches itself often dictate conduct which leads to individual catastrophe and at least temporary social calamity, and so is logically indefensible on the naturalistic view of the world. The ethical principles acknowledged by the best individuals and the most highly developed communities are compatible with Theism alone and can survive in no other intellectual environment.

Thus the way is prepared for the thorough-going treatment of Knowledge. Here it is pointed out that the very fundamental postulates of science are quite incapable of verification by the method which alone science pronounces admissible. Neither the existence of an external world, which science ingenuously takes for granted, nor the principles of universal causation and conservation, can be empirically demonstrated. How can universal laws be derived from particular instances? Yet these beliefs are inevitable, and Mr. Balfour affirms their truth, but insists that they require us to believe in a rational instead of a mechanical universe — in Theism. Thus the purpose of the book is fulfilled by making explicit the necessary implications of the ideals of Truth, Goodness, and Beauty.

The argument is not novel, but it has never been presented so clearly and cogently. As might be expected in the treatment of so wide and diversified a range of topics, there are points of detail where one or another reader will demur or deny; but taken as a whole, the book urges an argument for Theism which means more than any other to men sharing present ideas and cherishing present values. It is an appeal to Humanists to consider their ways, the worth of which is unhesitatingly declared, and see what is involved in devotion to them. To show that Theism is a necessary implication of Humanism is a worthy undertaking which has been successfully and strikingly carried out.

W. W. FENN.

THE RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE OF SAINT PAUL. PERCY GARDNER, Litt.D.
G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1911. Pp. xvi, 263.

This book is based upon a careful reading of the Pauline Epistles in the light of the religious beliefs and practices of the Apostle's time. Professor Gardner of Oxford is an accomplished classical scholar and a representative of Anglican liberalism. His critical position, as he himself tells us, is in general that of Jülicher. He treats Ephesians as Pauline, though not without reservation; he uses the Book of Acts with caution; and the Pastoral Epistles are not taken into account. Unlike some recent German critics, the author emphasizes the significance of Paul's conversion near Damascus as being in truth a sudden change in the direction of his life, and as marking the beginning of the liberty which he enjoyed as a Christian. Dr. Gardner also holds that the Apostle's personal inspiration is a reality; for "some men seem capable of receiving impulses from an underlying life, as the iron rod is adapted to receive the lightning" (pp. 51 f.).

The most important and interesting part of the book is the discussion of the influence of the Greek and Oriental mysteries upon Paul's presentation of the gospel. The author holds that they exerted a profound and lasting influence upon Christianity, and that it was Paul who opened the gates and let this flood of mysticism rush into the Christian Church. "The best points in the Mysteries were absorbed by Christianity," and "the worse passed into magic" (p. 67). There can indeed be no doubt, in the light of modern investigation, that many religious beliefs and practices which were entirely foreign to Judaism and the teaching of Jesus were adopted by the Christian Church from its Graeco-Roman environment, and that Catholicism in its various forms is the product of this process of adoption and assimilation. For example, baptism was at first only a rite symbolizing repentance and forgiveness, and the Lord's Supper was a very simple religious meal observed by the disciples in memory of their Master. But the Mysteries, which were sacramental as well as soteriological religions, had their sacraments of purification and communion; and in the Pauline churches, which were confined to Gentile soil, baptism and the Lord's Supper were regarded as sacraments in the strict sense of the word. Dr. Gardner maintains, however, at least in the case of baptism, that there was no idea of any magical efficacy in the sacrament present to the Apostle's mind (pp. 107, 110, and 212). Was this transformation of the two primitive Christian institutions justifiable, and should the sacramental interpretation of them be retained? One may of

course answer in the affirmative; for, as the author points out, the question of origin is different from the question of value. But those whose criterion is the mind of Christ, and who desire to see his religious experience reduplicated in his followers, will return to the earlier, non-sacramental view of both baptism and the Lord's Supper.

Paul's great and most distinctive contribution to the Christian Church, according to Professor Gardner, was his doctrine of salvation by faith, which "took its rise from personal spiritual experience" (p. 206). "His mystery of salvation by faith" was "not only the mainspring of his own life," but it has also been "the source of the best life of the Christian Church from that day to this. He felt in his own heart the power and influence of the spiritual force which was dawning on the world. . . . And because it was a reality and not a mere imagination, it inspired and thrilled" the great Apostle, and it has enthroned him "for all time as the Second Founder of Christianity" (pp. 262 f.).

On page 73, where the reference is to 1 Cor. 15 51, it is said that "at the coming of Christ some shall arise from sleep, and some shall be changed." This is a most inaccurate statement of what Paul expected to occur at the *parousia*. On page 92 Dr. Gardner must mean Hosea rather than Amos. On page 128, doubtless through inadvertence, the adjective "divine" is used of the Messiah whom the Jews were expecting. They did not ascribe divinity to the Messiah. On page 134 the statement that at the advent of the Lord "the material puts on immateriality" seems to the present writer to imply a complete misunderstanding of Paul's thought at this point. Many scholars will find the author's interpretation of Rom. 3 21-26 on pages 193 ff. unsatisfactory. Finally, an index of the subjects discussed in the work would have made it much more useful for reference.

Professor Gardner has written a very readable and suggestive book. Some of the views which he expresses require further study before they can be confidently accepted or rejected, but in the main his interpretation of Paulinism is sound.

WILLIAM H. P. HATCH.

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FICHTE'S RELIGIONSPHILOSOPHIE IM RAHMEN DER PHILOSOPHISCHEN GESAMMENTWICKLUNG FICHTE'S. EMANUEL HIRSCH. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen. 1915. Pp. 130.

This brochure seems to be a Doctor's thesis, which seeks to release Fichte's thoughts on religion from his general philosophy. The author, with German thoroughness, has searched out every idea and word in Fichte's collected works, and endeavored to exhibit his religious beliefs in their unity and continuity as well as in their interrelation with Fichte's changing systematic construction.

Dr. Hirsch finds that it was an independent speculative development which conducted Fichte's thought to its religio-philosophical counsel respecting a blessed life. He urges that we may apprehend this development in its full peculiarity if, leaving on one side all confusing and contingent particulars, we confine attention to its cardinal "moments." Fichte's principle and starting-point is the evidence, the certainty, which the ego wins in and of itself through the deed (*Tat*) of moral conviction. On this basis, on which firmly stands his speculation, he undertakes to comprehend the whole world out of the pure ego, which realizes self-certainty even against contradiction. This undertaking fails. Because self-affirmation of the ego is strictly apprehended as moral, it involves the affirmation of communion; and on this rock of fellowship-thoughts the syntheses break which have been construed on the grounds of the philosophy of the pure ego. Whoever affirms communion affirms God.

It is the self-affirmation of the moral ego which has ultimately led to the affirmation of God. Fichte's philosophy is philosophy of the ego; not, however, of the ego which realizes its self-certainty in the face of *Anstoss*, but of the ego which, surrendering itself to God, has realized the life and existence of God, and therefore can completely understand and possess itself only in case it understands the evidence accompanying life as that of the divine life itself. Thus our author thinks that the Fichtean speculative system of pure moralism can be maintained in opposition to annihilation which threatens it from the thought of communion, only by becoming a speculative doctrine of God. This, he says, is the secret of the philosophical development of Fichte.

The imposing unity and consistency of this development is due to the fact that it remained uninfluenced by all non-ethical and non-speculative interests, especially by all interests of a religious kind. As a speculative philosopher, Fichte did not presuppose belief in God, did not in fact really seek it; he found it. His conviction grew that only thought itself could free us from the needs and

extremities which thought had engendered. Dr. Hirsch thinks that the immanent self-criticism of every purely ethical *Weltanschauung* has been consummated in Fichte's philosophical development. The systematic value of this self-criticism is all the greater by virtue of its having taken place within the sphere of ethical idealism. The refutation of ethical idealism by appealing to the fact of universal sinfulness, was remote from Fichte, who never acknowledged that this fact was inevitable. But our author contends that he who cannot ignore the fact of universal sinfulness must evaluate the religious position which Fichte achieved, as untenable.

Dr. Hirsch has scrutinized Fichte's works in a painstaking manner. He has gathered the data exhaustively, and much that he says is illuminating. But—so it seems to this reviewer—his critical approach is faulty. All modern thought inherited an uncriticised *a priori* basis of experience; that is, an experience-less basis of experience. There has been a progressive reduction of this basis through our modern centuries. We have at length accepted frankly the task of demonstrating the complete experiential origin of the *a priori* element, by whatever name it be called. Now, what of the traditional *a priori* element did Fichte retain? What peculiar form did it take in his system? What contribution did he make to the historic transition to an exclusively experiential basis of experience, and what in this line did he bequeath as task to those who came after him? These questions indicate the method of treating the subject from the point of view of modern philosophical criticism. But Hirsch is a German; and it seems that, whether in philosophical system or in social structure, the German is definitively committed to an *a priori*, that is, an absolute of some kind.

GEORGE BURMAN FOSTER.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE. DOUGLAS CLYDE MACINTOSH, Ph.D.
The Macmillan Co. 1915. Pp. xviii, 503. \$2.50.

"The method of idealistic epistemology is like that of the quack physician; it first administers a drug which makes the patient's ailment chronic, thus making its own further services permanently indispensable." Even the idealists will have to admit some plausibility in this charge of Professor Macintosh in his very important book. For when the idealistic philosopher has introduced the neophyte into his wonderland, or put him through Alice's looking-

glass, many problems which were difficult enough before in the waking world become insoluble without his guidance. But the neo-realist is not found very much more satisfactory than the idealist in his interpretation of Being, and the dualist is lost in hopeless agnosticism. Critical monism is the term applied by Dr. Macintosh to his own theory of knowledge, and he makes out a very strong case for it.

The greatest question of epistemology for the last century has been, What kind of stuff is reality made of, and in what way or ways, if at all, do we human beings have experience of or acquaintance with it? Dr. Macintosh begins with the dualism which found its most famous expounder in Kant. There is the phenomenal world of things as they appear to our senses, or more strictly the world of our sensations and ideas, and the noumenal world of things-in-themselves, the true world of reality which lies back of the appearances. But there is no point of coincidence between these two worlds, and we are shut up to the knowledge of the world of our senses and can know nothing whatever about the ultimate reality. But if this is true, says our author, then we have no evidence of the existence of things-in-themselves, and it is dogmatism to assume that there are such things. One after another he considers the forms of dualism proposed by a long list of avowed agnostics, and by dualists who did not fully acknowledge agnosticism but are logically involved in it.

Professor Macintosh holds that the reasoning which leads to the Kantian agnosticism might be fairly illustrated in this syllogism: "What I suppose to be experience of independent reality is included within what I experience. But mere sense-impressions, which I do not know to be valid of independent reality, are also included in what I experience. Therefore what I suppose to be experience of independent reality is mere sense-impression, which I do not know to be valid of independent reality." A slight inspection will reveal the fallacy of "undistributed middle." This conclusion, however supported, that we never know "independent reality" in sense-experience, is, according to the author, the great error in Kant's system.

About a third of the book is then concerned with the fifty-seven or more varieties of idealism, or "*idea*-ism" as it might better be called to distinguish it from the view held by all moral persons that there are "ideals" which have valid authority over every personal life, a doctrine from which these systems of idealistic theories of knowledge or reality have gained much of their prestige and with which they have been often confused. "Idealistic absolute epistemo-

logical monism," the forms of which are now discussed, is defined as the view that "the real object and the perceived object are, at the moment of perception, numerically one, and the real object cannot exist at other moments, independently of any perception." Some types of idealism, however, identify the real as an abstraction from the immediately given, rather than the immediate datum of consciousness. We need not here dwell on the author's brief but satisfactory discussion of mystical idealism and logical idealism, the former especially familiar in the philosophy of India and the teachings of Christian mystics and the latter presented by Plato.

The third elemental type of idealism is the psychological — and from it many of our modern philosophical troubles flow. This is defined as "the interpretation of the physical object, under the influence of an erroneous suggestion arising in connection with the psychological point of view, as being essentially *idea*, in the psychological sense of that word, i.e. as being simply a part of consciousness, a content of conscious life which depends upon consciousness for its existence." Dr. Macintosh exposes the fallacy of this position by stating its defence in various forms, one of which, similar to the argument for dualism, involves the undistributed middle, as follows: "The unreal objectively is subjective (related to a subject); similarly all of which one is conscious is subjective (related to a subject); therefore all of which one is conscious is unreal objectively (mere idea)." Professor Perry's characterization of the argument as involving the fallacy of the ego-centric predicament, is approved. Limitations of space forbid even mention of the many interesting and popular forms of psychological idealism with which Professor Macintosh deals at length. As none of them is able to avoid this initial fallacy or to neutralize it by the addition of other ingenious fallacies, they must all be considered unsatisfactory. Chapter IX on "The Disintegration of Idealism" suggests the fate which the author sees already overtaking this doctrine.

Realism in present epistemology is the view "that the real object and the perceived object are at the moment of perception numerically one and that the real object may exist at other moments apart from perception." The author distinguishes two kinds, dogmatic and critical. The "new realists" of today defend the former kind, in which it is held "that 'secondary' or sense-qualities are *independent* of relation to a sensing subject," while his own, the "critical" view is that secondary qualities are *dependent* upon relation to the subject for their existence. A number of the neo-realists go from the rejection of the activity of consciousness in the creation of the secondary

qualities of objects, to a rejection of consciousness altogether as having any real existence, or to the position that it is a relation between physical objects.

In his own careful and convincing statement of his critical realism, Dr. Macintosh adds to the primary and secondary qualities distinguished by Locke, tertiary qualities. Primary qualities of physical objects he holds to be those discovered through sense-activity but not produced by it. Secondary qualities are discovered in the object only because produced and put there by the subject of sense-activity. Tertiary qualities (principally values) are placed in the object not by sense but by purposive though purely psychical activity of the subject.

In discussing the ways and means of knowing, the author holds that all cognition is perceptual, although with conceptual elements active in the perception. He says that our *a priori* knowledge — that which led to Kant's dualism and the chaos of later idealism — is all derived from *experience* either of the individual or the race.

Part II of this great book is taken up with the problem of mediate knowledge, discussing first the problem of truth (in which intellectualism, anti-intellectualism, pragmatism, and Bergson's intuitionism are all carefully examined), and the problem of proof.

Professor Macintosh's theories may be summed up in the term "critical monism," as he is in epistemology a "critical realistic monist," in morphology and genetic logic a "critical perceptual monist" and a "critical empirical monist," in logical theory a "critical pragmatic monist," and in methodology a "critical empirical monist." The great attraction about the positions which he takes, to the average student, will be his consistent clinging as closely to the common-sense views of reality and experience as it is possible for a scientist and philosopher to do. For this great service, many who will never read his book, because they will not study far enough into the technical subjects which he discusses to be able to appreciate it, will still owe him a great debt of gratitude, for he has at least made the enlightened common-sense view of the world respectable. No philosopher or student of the technical subjects discussed in this book can afford to be ignorant of it. The student of theology and religion will be interested at least in its conclusions, from which we may expect the anticipated companion volume on *The Problem of Religious Knowledge* to proceed.

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OUR KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST. LUCIUS HOPKINS MILLER. Henry Holt & Co. 1914. Pp. xiv, 166. \$1.00.

This little volume is valuable as a diagnosis and as suggesting a remedy. It is symptomatic of a state of mind which is calling forth numerous books and essays indicating wide-spread discontent with the traditional treatment of Jesus Christ. It has a ministry in that it briefly and in somewhat sketchy fashion indicates the lines of the re-constructed thought. Professor Miller undertakes to outline briefly the Sources, the Life, the Teachings of Jesus, and the resultant Conceptions of Him. The spirit of the discussions is modern and wise; and the book will take its place among a considerable output of literature seeking to orient to the modern mind the christological problem. It is essentially a historical study; and throughout the author has in mind the scientific conscience with its aversion to the miraculous and the supernatural. He seeks to indicate the principles by which the modern solutions must be sought.

A brief quotation from the Preface will help to introduce the author and his suggestive book. "I wish to emphasize that I am not particularly interested in pressing a new point of view upon any who honestly and intelligently hold to the age-old formulae and derive comfort and power from them. The religious life is the main thing for us all. But many of us have been obliged to readjust our views for the very sake of that Christian faith we long for and need. Many others have turned their backs upon the Church, and even upon all religion, because they have not been helped to a new view which would have shown them that such desertion is unnecessary, harmful, and wrong." The book is irenic and constructive in spirit.

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